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Perpetual Affordability Covenants: Can
These Land Use Tools Solve the Affordable
Housing Crisis?
Elizabeth Elia*
ABSTRACT
Approximately 3.8 million privately-owned residential housing units
in America today contain affordability covenants recorded in their chains
of title. State and local agencies and the District of Columbia use these
covenants to ensure that publicly-subsidized properties are actually used
to provide affordable housing. With rents at all-time highs and stagnant
wages, the affordable housing crisis has reached a fever pitch. House
Democrats are proposing billions more in housing subsidy. To the extent
those funds subsidize privately-owned housing development they, too,
will be secured by affordability covenants. In response to this crisis, a new
trend in high cost markets is to extend the duration of affordability
covenants into perpetuity to create or maintain a permanent stock of
privately-owned affordable housing, rather than allowing these covenants
to expire after some term of years. Despite their ubiquity, there is no
scholarship and remarkably little case law on the validity of affordability
covenants. This is astonishing given that affordability covenants often do
not satisfy the traditional requirements for real covenants or equitable
servitudes at common law, and yet are relied upon to secure billions of
dollars of public investment in affordable housing. The scarce case law
on affordability covenants relies on public land use justifications to uphold
these covenants, ignoring traditional property law doctrine. This Article
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argues that affordability covenants belong among the new, “hybrid,”
public/private land use devices that straddle traditional property law and
public land use law. The Article looks to other hybrid devices that have
received more judicial scrutiny and scholarly interest—particularly
conservation easements—and concludes that affordability covenants are
at risk of judicial invalidation unless they are supported by state enabling
legislation. Finally, the Article argues that the unique public purpose
driving perpetual affordability covenants gives rise to legislative
considerations that should be addressed by all state enabling acts.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: Affordability Covenants – Ubiquitous,
Unexamined and Unenforceable?

Imagine you are the director of the Department of Housing for a
major American city. A group of low-income senior citizens, most of
whom are Chinese-American, come to you for help. Their privatelyowned apartment building of more than 300 federally-subsidized units
(one of only two remaining in your city’s historic but gentrified Chinatown
neighborhood) is for sale. The seller’s asking price is approximately $200
million more than the subsidized rents can support. The seller justifies the
price by saying it is the value of the land after demolition of the existing
building, assuming the land will be used for luxury housing and retail.
Thirty-five years ago, in exchange for public financing, the developer of
the property recorded a real covenant that runs with the land restricting the
property for use as affordable housing for forty years. Even though there
are five years left on the covenant, there are commercial real estate
developers making bids for the building at or near the seller’s asking price,
confirming the market appetite to replace the building with the luxury
apartments and retail now ubiquitous in Chinatown. You must either
prepare for this property to leave your affordable housing portfolio when
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the covenant expires, recognizing that these elderly residents will almost
certainly be displaced not only from their building but from all of
Chinatown, or you must jump into the fray to compete for this property at
its unrestricted market rate in order to preserve it as affordable housing.1
To avoid having to make a decision like this with future affordable housing
projects, you consider an intriguing idea being used in Boston—the
perpetual affordability covenant.2 When developers record covenants that
run with the land in exchange for public financing in the future, instead of
allowing those covenants to expire after 15, or 40, or even 60 years, why
not make the covenant perpetual?
When public resources are invested into developing privately-owned,
affordable housing the public agency supplying the resource typically
requires the owner of the housing to promise, or covenant, that the housing
will only be used to house low- or moderate-income people.3 To ensure
that this promise is kept by whomever owns the land, even if the original
owner sells the property, the covenant is recorded into the land records
with the intent that the restriction “runs with the land.” Typically, the
covenant states that the public agency who supplied the public resource is
the beneficiary of the covenant and has the right to enforce the covenant
in law or in equity.4 Federal affordable housing financing program
regulations, like the HOME Investment Partnerships program (“HOME”)5
and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (“LIHTC”),6 set some

1. This hypothetical is loosely based on the story of Museum Square in Washington,
D.C. See Aaron Wiener, Bull in Chinatown: Developer Tells Section 8 Tenants to Pay Up
or Get Out, WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (July 9, 2014), http://bit.ly/2HZwKpa.
2. I would like to gratefully acknowledge that the inspiration for this article came
from my participation in a round-table meeting about the viability of perpetual affordability
covenants cohosted in November 2016 by the Urban Institute, Enterprise Community
Partners, D.C. Coalition for Smarter Growth, and the D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute and from
my work as an appointee on D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser’s Affordable Housing
Preservation Strikeforce in 2016.
3. See,
e.g.,
Preservation,
NCSHA,
https://www.ncsha.org/advocacyissues/preservation/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2019); Mechanisms for Preserving Affordability,
INCLUSIONARY HOUS., http://bit.ly/2YP0ksK (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
4. As an example, New Jersey has a mandatory statutory form for affordability
covenants. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:80-26.1 (2019).
5. The HOME program provides a formula grant match from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to states and localities primarily for the
purpose of expanding the supply of decent, safe, and affordable housing available to low
and very low-income households. To be awarded funds from HUD, participating
jurisdictions must implement multi-year strategies for acquiring, rehabilitating, or
constructing affordable rental housing via public-private partnerships. See HOME
Investment Partnerships Program Rule, 24 C.F.R. § 92.1 (2019).
6. The LIHTC program encourages private equity investment in the construction and
rehabilitation of rental housing reserved for households at or below 60% of the Area
Median Income. An affordable housing project owner participating in the LIHTC program
receives a 10-year tax credit that can be passed through to an investor in exchange for an
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of the original affordability covenant durations. For example, affordability
covenants required in exchange for HOME funds range from 5 to 20
years.7 The minimum affordability period required by the LIHTC program
is now 30 years.8 At the end of the restriction period, the covenant
automatically expires and the owner of the property is free to rent or sell
the housing unit at market rate.
By a very rough estimate, there are approximately 3.8 million
affordability covenants restricting privately-owned housing units in the
United States today.9 Affordability covenants have been regularly and
commonly used in privately-owned, publicly-funded affordable housing
development transactions since the 1980s, if not earlier.10 All states,
territories, and the District of Columbia require affordability covenants to
be recorded in the chain of title for housing subsidized with federal, state,
and local funds, including funds from the federal HOME and LIHTC
programs.11 Affordability covenants are used to restrict all types of
housing tenure, from single-family, condominium, and cooperative home

equity investment made prior to the project being placed in service. See I.R.C. § 42 (West
2018).
7. See 24 C.F.R. § 92.252.
8. See I.R.C. § 42.
9. It is extremely difficult to even approximate the number of affordability covenants,
as each covenant is recorded in the local land records for a particular property. Tallying the
number of housing units subsidized by federal programs mandating running covenants or
deed restrictions does not yield a reliable figure because many affordable housing projects
layer many sources of federal, state, and local financing. However, for raw data, we know
that 2,313,856 units were placed in service between 1995 and 2015 as a part of the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit program. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (last updated
May 24, 2019). Additionally, there are approximately 1.5 million units restricted as part of
HUD’s Project Based Rental Assistance, Moderate Rehabilitation, Sections 236, 202, and
811
programs.
See
Assisted
Housing:
National
and
Local,
HUD,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
According to the April 30, 2018 HOME Activities reports filed by all states, territories, and
the District of Columbia, there are currently 116,300 total units subsidized with federal
HOME funds. See Post 2011 HOME Activities, HUD EXCHANGE, http://bit.ly/2Wc79mE
(last visited Aug. 27, 2019). This data does not include state and local programs that require
restrictive covenants.
10. An extensive list of HUD low-income rental housing programs including,
Sections 202 and 811 housing, mixed-finance public housing, project-based Section 8, and
221(d)(3) mortgage insurance programs, require long-term affordability covenants running
with the land. See Mixed-Finance Amendment to Consolidated Annual Contributions
Contract (Exhibit E(V)(A)), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (Nov. 26, 1996),
bit.ly/2MsYgRn. Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects require a mandatory minimum
30-year affordability covenant. The first 15 years is called the “compliance period” and the
second 15 years or more is called the “extended use period.” See I.R.C. § 42(h)(6). States
have the discretion to extend the extended use period beyond 15 years. Id. The HOME
program also requires running covenants recorded in a state’s land records to secure
affordability. See 24 C.F.R. § 92.252(e)(1)(ii).
11. See Post 2011 HOME Activities, supra note 9.
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ownership units to large, multi-family, corporate-owned rental properties.
Many jurisdictions require affordability covenants in exchange for state
and local sources of public financing;12 when public lands are sold, leased,
or granted for residential use;13 or in exchange for zoning or permitting
requests.14
A recent trend in high cost markets15 is to extend the duration of
affordability covenants in perpetuity to create a lasting stock of affordable
housing insulated from gentrification and skyrocketing market rate
property values. Boston currently requires perpetual affordability
covenants for all privately-owned, publicly-funded affordable housing
projects.16 Many other small and large municipalities are considering
implementing perpetual affordability controls, or already use them in
some, but not all, of their affordable housing programs. For example, the
District of Columbia requires perpetual affordability secured by recorded
covenants for all dispositions of public land to be used for housing.17 For
units created as a part of the District of Columbia’s Inclusionary Zoning
program and New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing program,
covenants restrict the units for the life of the building.18 In September
2017, New York City’s Housing Preservation and Development agency
announced the roll-out of a policy to enable perpetual affordability in
housing created on publicly disposed land.19 In Maine and Oregon, the

12. According to the Center for Community Change’s Housing Trust Fund Projects,
forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have state housing trust fund programs,
most of which require affordability covenants to secure investments. Survey Report, Ctr.
for Cmty. Change, State Hous. Tr. Funds 2018, http://bit.ly/2Xw8KQQ (last visited June
3, 2019). E.g. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f) (West 2016) (establishing the California Low
and Moderate Income Housing Fund and requiring affordability covenants for all funded
projects).
13. E.g. D.C. CODE ANN. § 10-801(b-3)(1)(C) (West 2019).
14. E.g. N.Y.C., N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 23–90 (2018); Los Angeles property
owners requesting a broad variety of discretionary zoning adjustments are required by
ordinance to consent affordability covenants. Land Use Covenants, HOUS. CMTY. INV.
DEP’T, https://hcidla.lacity.org/land-use-covenants (last visited Aug. 27, 2019)
15. One measure of high cost housing markets is the National Low-Income Housing
Coalition’s annual report, “Out of Reach,” which documents the gap between wages and
rents in markets throughout the country. Out of Reach, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL.
(2019), https://reports.nlihc.org/oor.
16. City of Boston, Neighborhood Development Housing Policies, Section 7-3,
requires that all agency-assisted rental and cooperative housing be affordable in perpetuity
via an Affordability Covenant. See BOSTON, MA., REDEVELOPMENT AUTH. § 7-3 (2019),
https://bit.ly/2zdTJca.
17. See D.C. CODE § 10-801(b-3)(1)(C).
18. D.C. CODE § 6-1041.05(a)(2) (2007); N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 23911
(2018).
19. See Maria Torres-Springer, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Hous. Pres. and Dev., Address at the
Citizens Budget Commission Breakfast (Sept. 20, 2017), https://on.nyc.gov/30rEfgI.
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statutory default is that affordable housing covenants are of unlimited
duration.20
Federal, state, and local housing subsidy programs overwhelmingly
seem to require the use of affordability covenants based on the assumption
that these devices are appropriate and effective in binding the covenanter
and its successors at common law. Only six jurisdictions have passed
affordability covenant enabling acts to ensure the judicial enforceability
of affordability covenants despite their inconsistencies with common law
requirements.21 Notwithstanding their ubiquitous use, there is no
scholarship and remarkably little case law on the validity of affordability
covenants.22 This is surprising given the billions of dollars of public
investment these covenants are presumed to secure and the fact that
affordability covenants often do not satisfy the traditional common law
requirements for running real covenants or equitable servitudes. In
contrast, environmental servitudes, including conservation servitudes and
environmental remediation covenants—both close cousins of affordability
covenants—have received considerably more scholarly analysis.23 A
20. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 122(3)(A) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 456.280 (West 2008).
21. The six states with affordability covenant enabling statutes are California, Maine,
Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 62101(f) (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 126 (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 184, § 31 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.295 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, § 610 (West 1995); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:80-26.1 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3439.1-3 (1991).
22. See generally Martin v. Villa Roma, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 632 (1982); Oceanside
v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420 (1989); Columbus Park Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres.
& Dev., 598 N.E.2d 702 (N.Y. 1992); Montgomery Cty. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 721
A.2d 249 (Md. 1998); Cannavaro v. Washington Cmty. Hous., No. CV030091521S, 2005
WL 1433790 (Conn. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2005) (finding a use restriction, not an affordability
covenant, related to an affordable housing development valid, court relies on Restatement
of the Law (Third): Property (Servitudes) in combining real covenants, easements and
equitable servitudes under the single label “servitudes” and in finding that servitudes can
be validly created for the benefit of third parties appurtenant or in gross); Tivoli Stock
L.L.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., No. 108052/06, 2006 WL 3751468 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2006); Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir.
108 (2009); Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 266 P.3d 92 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); Huntington
Beach v. Lee, No. 30-2009-00329477, 2015 WL 10635010 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2015);
Boston Redevelopment Auth. v. Pham, 42 N.E.3d 645 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015); Society Hill
at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n., Inc. v. Twp. of Piscataway, 138 A.3d 596 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 2016); Payne v. Payne, No. 15 MISC 000125, 2016 WL 1230098 (Mass. Land
Ct. Mar. 30, 2016); 135 Wells Ave., L.L.C. v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 84 N.E.3d 1257
(Mass. 2017); In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. P’ship, 859 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(finding that in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the value of a Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit project equals the value of the project subject to its affordability restrictions,
not the unrestricted, market-rate value of the property).
23. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common
Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 3 (1989); Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and
the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J.
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comparison of this scholarly literature is cause for concern about the
judicial enforceability of most affordability covenants not supported by
state enabling legislation.
Although their legal footing at common law may be tenuous, the few
extant cases pertaining to affordability covenants have tended to enforce
the covenants, often based on uncomfortably vague public policy
rationales or contract grounds.24 However, if the trend toward affordability
covenants of perpetual duration continues to gain momentum, inevitably,
courts and the housing finance market will begin taking a harder look at
these covenants.25
373, 380–84) (2001) (noting the many shortcoming of conservation easements as
easements, real covenants or equitable servitudes at common law and the need for state
enabling statutes); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy
Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433,
436–40 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Privately Held Conservation Servitudes]; Jessica Owley,
Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation
Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 137 (2011) (describing conservation easements as
“a hybrid entity of property law, contract law, and private zoning”);
Kurt A. Strasser, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act: Why, How, and Whether, 34
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 533, 536–37 (2007) (“The Uniform Environmental Covenant
Act creates a state-law property interest that attaches use restrictions and monitoring and
other requirements to the land . . . There are questions about the creation of this kind of
servitude and its long term viability in the face of common law that is hostile to permanent
land use restrictions, as well as questions about how such a covenant can be modified, and
about achieving a level of legal enforceability . . . .”).
24. For cases relying on public policy justifications, see infra Section II.B.2.
Columbus Park Corp., 598 N.E.2d at 707, (enforcing affordability covenants in multifamily rental property enforced based on contract law); Montgomery Cty., 721 A.2d at 255
(finding amounts owed to county for sale of restricted property in excess of affordability
covenant resale formula found to be a personal liability of the seller, not a lien against the
property without analysis of validity of covenant); Nordbye, 266 P.3d at 100 (upholding
former tenant’s right to enforce an affordability covenant despite the covenant being
released by the remote grantor and the original grantee); Lee, 2015 WL 10635010, at *5
(finding an affordability covenant unenforceable where City failed to properly record the
covenant in the land records and the defendant acquired the property without constructive
or actual notice of the covenant); Pham, 42 N.E.3d at 646 (finding the defendant did not
violate the provisions of the covenant without analyzing the underlying validity of the
covenant during a suit to enforce proscription on unauthorized renting contained in
affordability covenant); Society Hill at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n., Inc., 138 A.3d at 602
(finding that the New Jersey Uniform Housing Affordability Controls regulations did not
authorize the township to unilaterally extend the duration of an affordability covenant
where the covenant itself did not grant the township such authority); Payne, 2016 WL
1230098, at *3 (enforcing owner-occupancy and resale requirements without an analysis
of the underlying validity of the covenant); 135 Wells Ave., L.L.C., 84 N.E.3d at 1265
(finding that a use restriction contained in property deed for the benefit of the city is a
property interested owned by the city and that the local board of zoning appeals did not
have the authority to demand that the city alter or release this interest and, further, that no
change in conditions of the neighborhood had occurred that would warrant termination of
the affordability covenant).
25. This same observation about the likelihood of intensifying scrutiny as restrictions
age and burdened properties are conveyed to subsequent owners was made with regard to
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This Article lays some necessary ground work in anticipation of that
harder look at the enforceability of affordability covenants. The Article
first walks through the ways that affordability covenants both conform and
fail to conform to the requirements of common-law private land use
restrictions (namely running covenants and equitable servitudes). Next,
the Article considers how affordability covenants both resemble and fail
to resemble public land use restrictions (namely zoning). Finding that
affordability covenants are neither purely public nor purely private land
use devices, the Article concludes that affordability covenants belong
among the constellation of “hybrid” public/private land use devices
created in the latter half of the twentieth century. As with other “hybrid”
land use devices (namely conservation servitudes, environmental
covenants, contingent zoning, and development agreements)—enabling
legislation is necessary to overcome discrepancies with common-law
requirements and to ensure the enforceability of affordability covenants.
Next the Article turns to an examination of the public land use
rationale undergirding affordability covenant enabling legislation. A
review of the six existing state enabling acts reveals that, while these
enabling acts are certainly better than nothing, they generally fail to clearly
articulate elements of substantive and procedural due process that are the
hallmark of valid public land use regulation. Better affordability covenant
enabling legislation is possible. The Article first looks to zoning law to
sketch the parameters of state contracting and police powers vis á vis
development exactions jurisprudence.
Finally, the Article weighs two alternative fundamental policy goals
for perpetual affordability covenant enabling legislation: one based in
suppressing the value of real estate and the other based in capturing the
value of the property interest created by the covenant, and the divergent
drafting concerns each approach suggests.
II.

NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE, BUT A HYBRID OF THE TWO

Perpetual affordability covenants are unquestionably land use
restrictions—they are intended to restrict specific parcels of land for use
exclusively as “affordable housing” (in the myriad ways that term can be
defined).26 However, they do not fall neatly into any of the categories of
land use restriction cognizable in traditional property law. Most first year
property students are taught that land use restrictions are bifurcated into
private land use restrictions between discrete private parties, and public
Conservation Easements in 2008. C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of
Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25 (2008).
26. There is a legitimate, on-going debate about what “affordable housing” means.
For simplicity, I will use the term inclusively to refer to any housing that is sold or rented
below its market rate to buyers or renters whose incomes do not exceed designated limits.
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land use restrictions created by public legislative or executive bodies and
applied to regions through legislation and regulation.27 In this section, the
Article explains that perpetual affordability covenants resemble private
land use restrictions (namely servitudes) in many ways, but not necessarily
enough to be enforceable as servitudes according to traditional common
law. The Article will then discuss the Restatement of Law Third
(Property): Servitudes (“Restatement”)’s treatment of affordability
covenants, including its attempt to validate affordability covenants as well
as its unclear influence on the law. Additionally, this Article will argue
that while in form perpetual affordability covenants do not resemble
zoning, in function they do. Thus, this part of the Article will draw the
conclusion that perpetual affordability covenants are a hybrid of public
and private land use regulation, potentially lacking validity as servitudes
at traditional common law. After considering how the blending of state
contract and police powers in public/private land use agreements can be
“basically legitimate or fundamentally flawed,”28 this part will finally
consider scholarship, case law, and legislation in relation to the
enforceability of another “hybrid” public/private land use device—
conservation servitudes.
A.

Risk of Invalidity as Common Law Real Covenants or
Equitable Servitudes
1.

Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes Refresher

Before analyzing affordability covenants’ validity as either real
covenants or equitable servitudes, it may be necessary to provide a refresh
of this arcane area of property law. Real covenants and equitable
servitudes are non-possessory, private-land-use controls recognized at
common law, whereby one piece of land is burdened for the benefit of
another piece of land.29 They are enforceable promises made between
private landowners that are intended to “run with the land,” burdening or
benefiting the land regardless of whether the original parties sell their

27. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 521 (Jesse
H. Chopper et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000); JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 777 (Vicki Been
et al. eds., 8th ed. 2013); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 665, 783 (Jesse H. Chopper et al. eds., 3d ed. 2015); ALICIA
B. KELLY & NANCY J. KNAUER, PROPERTY LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 553
(2017).
28. Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use
Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 965 (1987).
29. CHARLES E. CLARK, “REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH
LAND” 1–6 (2d ed. 1947).
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lands to subsequent buyers.30 As promises between private parties,
whether the original covenant is enforceable is determined by contract
law.31 However, whether the benefits and burdens created by the original
parties are binding on subsequent owners of the subject parcels is the
subject of property law.32
The traditional test for determining whether a covenant “runs with
the land” requires: (1) the covenant be made by express grant in
conformity with the Statute of Frauds; (2) horizontal and vertical privity;
(3) the original parties intended that both the benefit and the burden of the
covenant should “run” to subsequent owners; (4) the covenant “touch and
concern” the land; and (5) subsequent parties have notice of the
covenant.33 Traditionally, an aggrieved party is entitled to a remedy at law
in the event of violation of a real covenant.34
Equitable servitudes are similar to real covenants in that they are
private restrictions on the use of land. However, they are enforceable in
equity and the test for their existence is more lenient than the test for real
covenants. Equitable servitudes require: (1) express grant in a writing that
satisfies the Statute of Frauds; (2) intent of the original parties that the
benefit of the servitude should “run”; (3) the covenant “touch and concern”
the land; and (4) notice of the servitude.35
Traditionally, running covenants and equitable servitudes were
disfavored as antithetical to the free and unfettered use of land.36 The party
seeking to enforce the covenant had the burden of proving that the
covenant satisfied common law requirements.37
2.

Affordability Covenants Often Do Not Satisfy the
Requirements for Real Covenants

In this section, the Article examines whether affordability covenants
satisfy each of the common law requirements for real covenants and
equitable servitudes. Most affordability covenants will satisfy the
following requirements: the Statute of Frauds; the parties’ intent that the
covenant run; vertical privity; and notice. However, this Article will argue
30. William Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV.
861, 864 (1977).
31. Id. at 867.
32. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 892–93.
33. Stoebuck, supra note 30, at 867.
34. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 27, 717–18. See also STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 473–90.
35. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 492, 495–99.
36. See CLARK, supra note 29, at 72; Susan French, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1281–82 (1982).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note, at 346 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
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that affordability covenants often will not satisfy the requirements of
horizontal privity nor that the benefit of the covenant touch and concern
the land. Moreover, this section explains how affordability covenants may
be at risk of being invalidated as unreasonable restraints on alienation.
a.

Affordability Covenants Typically Comply with the
Statute of Frauds, Intent to Run, Vertical Privity, and
Notice Requirements

Affordability covenants are usually created by express grant from the
burdened land owner to a benefiting public body with language stating
“this covenant is intended to bind successors in interest and run with the
land” or the like.38 This writing usually satisfies the Statute of Frauds and
provides evidence of the parties’ intent that the covenant should run with
the land.39 Affordability covenants are typically recorded as their own,
free-standing documents in the chain of title of the burdened property, but
may also be included as covenants in a deed, ground lease, or even
(unwisely) mentioned in a deed or ground lease but fully articulated in an
unrecorded document.40 This recording usually supplies subsequent
purchasers with valid constructive notice. Finally, because affordability
covenants apply to residential real estate, which is typically conveyed in
its entirety in fee simple, there is rarely concern with the vertical privity
requirement for real covenants and equitable servitudes.41
b.

Affordability Covenants Often Lack Horizontal
Privity

It is less clear that affordability covenants meet the requirements for
horizontal privity traditionally required for a real covenant to run at
common law. The majority rule in American courts is that horizontal
privity exists when part or all of an estate is conveyed from one party to
another, as in the conveyance of a leasehold, easement, or fee estate.42 In
38. See generally HOME Investment Partnerships Program Rule, 24 C.F.R.
§ 92.252(e)(1) (2013).
39. E.g., New Jersey’s mandatory covenant form at N. J. ADMIN. CODE §5:80-26.1
(2017).
40. See generally Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, 127
Cal. App. 4th 248 (2005) (finding that a Deed of Trust secured both affordability
restrictions and Note and, therefore, prepayment of the Note did not entitle the property
owner to release of the Deed of Trust until expiration of the affordability restriction);
Huntington Beach v. Lee, No. 30-2009-00329477, 2015 WL 10635010, at *5 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 17, 2015) (finding the covenant unenforceable because the defendant bought a
condominium unit without actual or constructive notice when the legal description attached
to the covenant failed to properly identify the subject unit).
41. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 482.
42. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 895; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra
note 27, at 485.
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the twentieth century, American courts broadened their view of privity to
allow homeowners’ associations to enforce covenants as agents of
neighboring landowners.43 This development is significant because
homeowners’ associations sometimes own no interest in land at all,44
which means that there is nothing upon which a covenant benefit can
attach. Therefore, property-less homeowners’ associations lack both
horizontal and vertical privity.
Applying the horizontal privity requirement to affordability
covenants, there is a clear case for horizontal privity when there is a
conveyance of real estate from a municipality to the affordable housing
developer. For example, a city sale, grant, or ground lease of land that it
owns to an affordable housing developer through its public disposition
regulations should constitute horizontal privity.45 However, where a
municipality merely lends or grants money to an affordable housing
project without having conveyed the real estate for the project, it is less
certain that a court will find that the horizontal privity requirement has
been met.46
Of course, this problem with horizontal privity can be resolved
(though perhaps not easily) by conveying the real estate to the public body
and then back to the intended owner, once again. Alternatively, there may
be an argument that the owner’s granting of a deed of trust to the public
body to secure repayment of loan funds or performance of affordability
covenant obligations creates a contemporaneous property interest
sufficient to create horizontal privity.47 For example, in Dieckmeyer v.
43. See Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n., Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 798 (N.Y. 1938).
44. E.g., in Neponsit, a developer constructed a neighborhood and conveyed each
parcel to homebuyers with a covenant requiring each homeowner to pay a neighborhood
association fee. The developer assigned the benefit of the covenant to a neighborhood
association, created by the developer, which owned no real estate whatsoever. When the
neighborhood association attempted to enforce the covenant to pay dues against the
defendant, the defendant challenged the validity of the covenant because the plaintiff
neighborhood association was not in horizontal privity with the developer. Id. at 797–98.
45. In Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, the Housing Authority
sold the property to the Riekses’ predecessors in interest and included the affordability
covenant in the deed at the time of conveyance. 78 Va. Cir. 108, 108 (2009). In Oceanside
v. McKenna, the City’s Community Development Commission sold the property to the
affordable housing developer and recorded the affordability covenant at the time of
conveyance. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1423 (1989).
46. See Montgomery Cty. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 721 A.2d 249, 257, 259 (Md.
1998) (finding that the affordability covenant instrument affecting a single-family home
did not specifically create a lien against the property, nor was it a right or estate in land
and, therefore, the county’s right to surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale was that of a
general creditor, subordinate to other, prior recorded, judgement creditors and the purchase
money mortgage).
47. In one New York case, a servitude was enforced where the covenantee was a
purchase money mortgagee. Without directly addressing the issue, the court apparently
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Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, the California Appellate
Court declined to release the deed of trust held by the municipality when
the homeowner prepaid her Note to the municipality in full, because the
court concluded that the deed of trust also secured the homeowner’s
promise to abide by the affordability restrictions contained in the
conditions, covenants, and restrictions of the subdivision and in the
homeowner’s deed.48
c.

The Benefit of Affordability Covenants Often Does
Not Touch or Concern Land

It is also unclear whether the benefit of an affordability covenant can
be said to “touch and concern” the land. Traditionally, for the burden of a
covenant or servitude to run with the burdened estate, both the burden and
the benefit of the covenant must “touch and concern” parcels of real
estate.49 This necessitates the existence of a “benefiting estate.”50
When the benefit of a covenant or servitude does not touch and
concern a benefiting estate, but instead benefits an individual or private
party, the benefit is said to be “in gross.”51 Regardless of whether the
burden of a covenant runs to a subsequent owner when the benefit is held
in gross, a handful of courts have held that the covenant as between the
original grantor and grantee is invalid based on the public policy favoring
free alienability of land where there is no benefiting estate at the time the
covenant is created.52
The benefiting party in an affordability covenant is typically a local
body of government or a local housing agency that holds the benefit in

assumed that a mortgage was a sufficient property interest to entitle the benefiting party to
enforcement of the covenant. See Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power
Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. 1973).
48. In Dieckmeyer, the court did not address horizontal privity because it was not in
dispute – the homeowner entered into the affordability covenant upon conveyance of the
property from the private developer of the condominium complex. Dieckmeyer v.
Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, 127 Cal. App. 4th 248, 258 (2005).
49. As stated by Thomas E. Roberts:
On the burden side, the generally accepted test is that in order for a transferee of
the original promisor to be bound, both the benefit and burden must touch and
concern, or be appurtenant to, land. In other words, not only must the promisor
have land that is affected by the promise, but so too must the promise must also
[sic] have land affected. If the benefit of the promise does not concern or relate
to land, then the benefit is regarded as personal, or in gross, and the successor to
the promisor will not be bound.
Thomas E. Roberts, Promises Respecting Land Use – Can Benefits be Held In Gross?, 51
MO. L. REV. 933, 937 (1986).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 934. See also, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 440.
52. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 938.
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gross—not for the benefit of another estate in land.53 The majority
common law rule would find these covenants, whose benefits are held in
gross by a government agency, unenforceable against subsequent holders
of the burdened estate.54 For example, in Wilmurt v. McGrane, the New
York Court of Appeals found that a covenant made by a landowner to the
state Department of Health could not run because the Department of
Health owned no land to which the benefit of the covenant could attach.55
Nonetheless, in enforcing affordability covenants, most courts have
not found the touch and concern requirement an insurmountable obstacle,
even if their rationales are not always clear. For example, in Nordbye v.
BRCP/GM Ellington, an affordable housing developer recorded an
affordability covenant for the benefit of the Oregon Housing and
Community Services Department (“OHCS”) and income-qualifying
former, current, and future tenants of the property.56 In preparing for a
foreclosure sale of the property, OHCS and the subsequent owner of the
property entered into and recorded a release of the property’s “Extended
Use Agreement” (an affordability covenant).57 Ms. Nordbye, a resident of
the property, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the
affordability covenant despite the recorded release agreement.58 The
foreclosure buyer argued that the affordability covenant was invalid and
never ran with the land because there was no vertical privity and the
benefit of the covenant did not touch and concern an estate of OHCS.59
Rather than addressing these challenges to the requirement for a running
real covenant directly the court dismissed them out of hand with an
unsatisfying contract law rationale, relying on the fact that the original
parties deemed the requirements for a running covenant satisfied in the
original instrument.60

53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
54. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 960 (arguing that a benefit in the public interest
should be a valid substitute for a dominant estate).
55. See Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 416 (N.Y. 1897); but see Bill Wolf
Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951 (N.Y. 1973)
(finding that a mortgagee was entitled to enforce covenant in equity).
56. See Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 213–15 (2011).
57. See id. at 216–17.
58. See id. at 217.
59. Id. at 225.
60. The court suggested that the original parties created a running real covenant
binding on subsequent purchasers based solely in contract law. Indeed, the court continued
with a circumlocutory, “we are not aware of any authority supporting the proposition that
such an agreement [“deemed satisfactory” language] is legally ineffective.” Id. The
rationale misses the opportunity to point out that all of the requirements for a running
covenant, including privity and the requirement that the covenant touch and concern an
estate of the grantee, are satisfied as between the grantor and Ms. Nordbye as a tenant
beneficiary under the covenant.
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There is one instance of a court specifically finding that an
affordability covenant does touch and concern the land.61 In Fairfax
County Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Riekse, the Virginia
Circuit Court looked only to whether the burden of the covenant touched
and concerned the burdened land and relied heavily on public policy and
contract justifications for the affordability covenant.62 In several other
cases, the courts simply ignored the requirement that the benefit of a
covenant run with the land.63
d.

Affordability Covenants are Almost
Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation

Always

Beyond the problem of failing to meet the horizontal privity and
touch and concern prongs of the real covenants and equitable servitudes
tests, affordability covenants run the risk of being found invalid as
unreasonable restraints on alienation. Until the twentieth century, running
covenants and servitudes were disfavored restraints on alienation that
prevented real property from being put to its highest and best use.64 In
traditional property law, restraints on alienation are divided into direct and
indirect restraints.65 A direct restraint is “a provision which, by its terms,
prohibits or penalizes the exercise of the power of alienation.”66 At
common law, direct restraints on alienation are generally void.67 Direct
61. Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 114 (2009)
(stating, “[a]ccordingly, sale of a property to carry out the Housing Authority’s goal of
providing “safe, decent, and sanitary housing for those citizens with low or moderate
incomes” touches and concerns this property”) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 36–3 (2018)).
62. In addition, the Virginia Circuit Court stated that:
The Housing Authority sold this property to the Tovars pursuing the goals of the
Act and the Tovars purchased the property with the condition that furthered the
purpose of the Act. If I were to adopt a narrow interpretation of “touch and
concern the land” by holding that an unfettered sale of the property did not “touch
and concern” the land I would frustrate actions taken by the Plaintiff and agreed
to by the Grantees in pursuit of the legislative goals set out for it in Virginia Code
§ 36–2.
Id. at 113.
63. In McKenna, the court treated an affordability restriction contained in a
neighborhood’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restriction (“CC&Rs”) as enforceable like
any other CC&Rs, despite the fact that the parties authorized to enforce the CC&Rs are the
City and the housing commission. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1423 (1989).
64. See Stoebuck, supra note 30, at 885–86; Charles E. Clark, Limiting Land
Restrictions, 27 A.B.A. J. 737, 739 (1941).
65. See LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 237 (2d ed.
1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DON. TRANS. I II INTRO. NOTE (1983);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
66. SIMES, supra note 65, at 237.
67. See id. at 237–52 (cataloguing the three kinds of direct restraints on alienation,
disabling restraints, forfeiture restraints, and promissory restraints, and explaining the
limited circumstances when forfeiture and promissory restraints might be enforceable at
common law); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 232–33.
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restraints include prohibitions on transfers without consent of a third party,
prohibitions on transfers to particular persons, requirements for transfers
to particular persons, options to purchase land, and rights of first refusal.68
Affordability covenants typically include one or more of the direct
restraints listed above.69 For example, the affordability covenants involved
in several of the cases discussed above, as well as the New Jersey statutory
affordability covenant form, all prohibit transfers of subject properties
without prior agency approval and allow transfers only to eligible lowincome buyers.70 As discussed above, the affordability covenants in Riekse
and Montgomery County v. May Department Stores Co. granted the county
housing agencies options to repurchase the subject properties, another type
of direct restraint.71
Throughout the twentieth century, some jurisdictions have turned
away from invalidating all direct restraints on alienation in favor of the
view that restraints on alienation may be valid if they are reasonable.72
Reasonableness is determined by balancing the justification for the
restriction against the quantum of restraint.73 One of the three factors
typically considered in the balancing test is the duration of the
restriction—the longer the covenant, the greater the quantum of restraint,
the more likely the covenant will be found unreasonable and thus
unenforceable.74 To the extent that common law calls into question the
enforceability of affordability covenants as direct restraints on alienation,

68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 comment b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
69. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:50-26 (2018); see also Payne v. Payne, No. 15 MISC
000125, 2016 WL 1230098, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 30, 2016).
70. See Society Hill at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n., Inc. v. Twp. of Piscataway, 138
A.3d 596, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2016); Payne, 2016 WL 1230098, at *2;
Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach, 127 Cal. App. 4th 248, 250–
52 (2005) ; Huntington Beach v. Lee, No. 30-2009-00329477, 2015 WL 10635010, at *1
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:50-26 (2018).
71. Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 108
(2009); Montgomery Cty. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 721 A.2d 249, 252 (Md. 1998).
72. See In re Tamen, 22 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1994); Mardis v. Brantley, 717 So.2d
702, 709 (2d Cir. 1998); Tovrea v. Umphress, 556 P.2d 814, 818–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976);
Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV.
L. REV. 373, 374 (1935) (exploring, and supporting, broader judicial acceptance of racially
restrictive covenants at the time, stating, “the courts will necessarily be influenced by the
extent to which elimination of social friction and maintenance of property values may be
secured by upholding such restraints”).
73. See Alfaro v. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Sys. & Plan. Ass’n, 141 Cal. App. 4th
1356, 1376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
74. Metro. Dade Cty. v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So.2d 551, 552–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (considering duration of covenant, 30 years, with automatic 10-year extensions,
unless a majority of neighboring property owners consent to release, to be unreasonable
restraint on alienation); Clark, supra note 64, at 739; Manning, supra note 72, at 381–91.
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perpetual affordability covenants are even more suspect; increasing the
risk that the covenant will be deemed unreasonable.75
Despite the common law’s position on direct restraints on alienation,
three California cases have directly addressed whether affordability
covenants are unreasonable restraints on alienation, and all three have
found that they are reasonable and enforceable.76 In Martin v. Villa Roma,
Oceanside v. McKenna, and Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement
Systems & Planning Ass’n, the California Court of Appeals applied the
balancing test and found that the covenants supported a strong public
interest in creating affordable housing.
Of particular note, the Alfaro plaintiffs challenged the affordability
covenant as unreasonable because of the fact that it was perpetual in
duration.77 The court dodged the issue without directly addressing the
validity of perpetual covenants by finding that the covenant created was
not of perpetual duration but was limited by the covenant language to the
duration “while the ‘development . . . remains in existence in or upon any
part of, and thereby confers benefit upon, the subject property described
herein.’”78
3.

Affordability Covenants Often Do Not Meet the
Requirements of Valid Equitable Servitudes

It is similarly uncertain whether affordability covenants pass
common law muster as equitable servitudes. As mentioned above, the test
for the validity of equitable servitudes also requires that the servitude
touch and concern the benefiting parcel.79 Direct restraints on alienation
are similarly likely to invalidate an equitable servitude. Since modern
American courts have merged law and equity, and the requirements for
equitable servitudes are slightly more liberal than those for real covenants,
equitable servitudes have nearly replaced real covenants in American
courts.80 The majority of equitable servitudes today are upheld as

75. “In determining the injurious consequences likely to flow from enforcement of a
restraint on alienation, the nature, extent and duration of the restraint are important
considerations.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
76. See Martin v. Villa Roma, 131 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635 (1982); see also Oceanside
v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420,1427–28 (1989); see also Alfaro, 141 Cal. App. 4th
at 1376–77.
77. See Alfaro, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1378.
78. Id. at 1379.
79. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 495 (“To run, equitable restrictions
must touch and concern benefited and burdened land, and the requirement should be
exactly the same as for real covenants.”); Roberts, supra note 49, at 934 (“[M]ost courts in
this country deny enforceability to covenants and servitudes in gross.”).
80. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 493.
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neighborhood restrictions in common interest communities.81 These socalled “reciprocal servitudes” exist when all houses in a neighborhood are
bound by the same covenants, conditions, and restrictions declared by the
developer of the neighborhood for the benefit of each neighboring house.82
Often affordability covenants apply to fewer than all of the properties in a
common interest community and thus are not reciprocal servitudes. For
example, in Riekse, the Virginia Circuit Court found that the affordability
restriction failed as an equitable servitude because it was not part of a
common neighborhood plan imposed by a common grantor.83 The
Virginia rule, which limits equitable servitudes to only those restrictions
applied to an entire subdivision by a common developer or grantor, is
unusual. In the majority of jurisdictions, the difference between real
covenants and equitable servitudes has been functionally erased.84
4.

Affordability Covenants Fare Much Better Under the
Restatement

While affordability covenants may not meet the traditional
requirements for real covenants and equitable servitudes at common law,
they are by no means the only modern land use restrictions to encounter
this problem. The Restatement was published in 2000 as an ambitious
effort to not only unify the law of servitudes, but also to modernize the law
to better accommodate modern land use restrictions like common interest
community covenants, affordability covenants, and conservation
easements.85 The effect of this Restatement, however, continues to unfold.
Private land use restrictions are a notoriously confusing area of
traditional property law.86 The Restatement attempts to modernize and
streamline this disjointed, contradictory, and overlapping body of law87 by
stripping away many of the formalistic eccentricities of real covenants and
81. See id. at 504–14.
82. See id. at 505.
83. See Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 113
(2009) (“By definition, an equitable servitude can only arise when a common grantor
imposes a common restriction upon land developed for sale in lots.”). However, in most
jurisdictions, real covenants and equitable servitudes are functionally merged, so that
remedies at law or in equity may be permitted no matter the technical name of the
restriction. See, e.g., Oceanside v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1426 (1989) (“Here,
the CC&Rs are covenants running with the land. The Legislature has recognized that
‘covenants and restrictions in the [document creating a condominium project] shall be
enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable . . . .’”).
84. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 493.
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
86. Professor Susan French describes the law of easements, real covenants, and
equitable servitudes as “. . . the most complex and archaic body of American property law
remaining in the twentieth century,” and includes a bevy of scholarly lamentation. French,
supra note 36, at 1261 n.1.
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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equitable servitudes under the single term “covenant that runs with land.”88
As a guiding principal, the Restatement attempts to jettison archaic
technical rules that no longer serve a compelling purpose and replace them
with unified rules based on freedom of contract, notice, and conformity
with public policy.89 These rules reflect the reality that throughout the
twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of covenants and servitudes
have been created as restrictions to govern private residential development
or “common-interest communities,”90 and have been overwhelmingly
enforced as devices to enhance value and marketability of private
residential property.91 The Restatement contains several ambitious and
controversial articulations of the law of servitudes,92 but the three that most
pertain to the enforceability of perpetual affordability covenants are the
Restatement’s treatment of the touch and concern doctrine,93 direct
restraints on alienation,94 and the shifting of the burden of proof in
establishing the validity of a servitude.95
a.

The Restatement’s Supersession of the Touch and
Concern Doctrine Aids the Enforceability of
Affordability Covenants

Arguably, the articulation in the Restatement that has garnered the
most criticism by scholars is the section that declares the supersession of
the touch and concern doctrine.96 Section 3.2 of the Restatement states,
Neither the burden nor the benefit of a covenant is required to touch or
concern land in order for the covenant to be valid as a servitude. Whether

88. Id. § 1.4.
89. See Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of
Property Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1231 (1988).
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. (AM. LAW INST. 2000). . It
has been noted “that the subject of running covenants has become virtually synonymous
with covenants in subdivisions and condominiums.” Id. The Restatement has been praised
for “squarely situat[ing] the modern problems with servitudes in the context of the common
interest community.” Id.
91. See French, supra note 89, at 1217–18.
92. This Article will not explore the Restatement’s extensive treatment of law related
specifically to Common-Interest Communities and will only briefly consider the
Restatement’s attempt to discontinue the terms “real covenants” and “equitable servitudes”
under the unified term “covenant that runs with land.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 1.4. (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
93. See id. § 3.2.
94. See id. § 3.4.
95. See id. § 3.1.
96. See Note, Touch and Concern, The Restatement Third of Property: Servitudes,
and A Proposal, 122 HARV. L. REV. 938, 938 (2009); A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern
is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REV. 804, 805 (1998); Stewart Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV.
615, 661 (1984).
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a servitude is valid is determined under the general rule stated in §3.1
and the particular rules stated in §§ 3.4 through 3.7.97

There is confusion in the scholarship over whether the Restatement
eliminates the doctrine of touch and concern,98 or retains the doctrine but
eschews the label. Restatement Reporter Professor French suggested that
the Restatement’s intention is not to eliminate the doctrine, but only to
discontinue use of what has become a confusing term of art.99
Agreeing that the Restatement has this effect, Stoebuck and Whitman
trace the continuation of the doctrine through the various sections of the
Restatement.100 They explain that Section 5.2 of the Restatement permits
“appurtenant” benefits and burdens to run,101 and § 1.5 defines
“appurtenant” as meaning “that the rights or obligations of a servitude are
tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land.”102
The comment to § 1.5 explains, “[o]nly appurtenant benefits and burdens
run with land . . . .”103 However, the Restatement deviates significantly
from the common law implications of the touch and concern doctrine by
declaring that an appurtenant burden (for example, a perpetual
affordability covenant affecting a specific parcel of real estate) can run
even if the benefit of the covenant is held in gross (for example, when the
beneficiary of an affordability covenant is a municipality).104
b.

Affordability Covenants are Not
Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation

Necessarily

In keeping with the Restatement’s goal to uphold servitudes under
the rationale of freedom of contract subject to limitations based on
illegality, unconstitutionality, or violations of public policy,105 the
Restatement allows direct restraints on alienation so long as the restraint
is reasonable.106 In determining whether a direct restraint is reasonable, the
Restatement adopts the balancing tests articulated in Oceanside v.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
98. Tarlock, the editor of the Harvard Law Review, and Dukeminier fall into the camp
of viewing the Restatement as eliminating the doctrine altogether. Tarlock, supra note 96,
at 805; Note, supra note 96, at 938; DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 27, at 918.
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES 3–4 Intro. Note (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
100. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 480.
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 5.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
102. Id. § 1.5.
103. Id. § 1.5 cmt. a.
104. See id. § 2.6 cmt. d (“[B]enefits of affirmative and negative covenants . . . can
be held in gross. Benefits in gross are useful in a variety of transactions in which burdens
running with the land are desired, are permitted whether the servitude is a covenant, and
easement or a profit.”).
105. See id. § 3.1 cmt. a (2000).
106. See id. § 3.4.
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McKenna and similar cases.107 In weighing the utility of the restraint, the
Restatement mentions servitudes used to preserve affordable housing,108
but goes on to state, “[i]n determining the injurious consequences likely to
flow from enforcement of restraint on alienation, the nature, extent, and
duration of the restraint are important considerations.”109 In perhaps the
most extensive acknowledgement of affordability covenants in any
generalized treatment of servitudes, the Restatement actually contains a
comment specifically addressing affordability covenants:
Programs designed to provide affordable housing depend on severe
restrictions on alienation to prevent resales at market prices. Such
restraints include limitations on the price for which units can be sold, as
well as limitations on permissible transferees. They may also include
requirements that the owner sell when the owner ceases to be a member
the group for whom the housing is provided. Such restraints are
reasonable so long as designed to serve a legitimate purpose and so long
as they permit a reasonable opportunity for the owner to transfer the
unit.110

Such direct recognition of affordability covenants offers welcomed
clarity in determining whether these direct restraints on alienation should
nonetheless be deemed enforceable. By referring to “units” and
obligations to sell when “the owner ceases to be a member of the group
for whom the housing is provided,” it is clear that the comment
contemplates affordability covenants in the single-family homeownership
context only, not affordability covenants as applied to owners of multifamily rental properties. In the context of perpetual affordability covenants
affecting large, multi-family rental properties, the Restatement’s
reasonableness test for affordability restraints seems anemic. For example,
the “reasonable opportunity for the owner to transfer” language in the
Restatement seems to be referring to the certification process typically
implemented to qualify potential buyers of affordable ownership
housing.111 In contrast, one can imagine various scenarios that regularly
arise in the affordable, multi-family, rental housing industry that are
beyond the Restatement’s guidance, such as the impact of a covenant on a
project owner’s ability to refinance, recapitalize a project, or re-organize
an owner-entity.
However, to the extent that the Restatement intends to shift
enforceability determinations regarding servitudes away from archaic

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
See id. § 3.4 cmt c.
Id.
Id. § 3.4 cmt. h.
Id.; see, e.g., Land Use Covenants, supra note 14.
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black letter law and toward judicial oversight based on reasonableness,112
the comment regarding affordable housing as reasonable restraints on
alienation may be successful.
c.

The Restatement Shifts the Burden of Proof for
Servitude Validity

While much ink has been spilt about the Restatement declaration that
the touch and concern doctrine is superseded, the greatest seismic shift in
the Restatement is definitely in switching the presumption of validity of
servitudes.113 Traditionally, common law has disfavored servitudes as
antithetical to fundamental precepts of fee simple ownership.114 In
contrast, the Restatement presumes that servitudes are valid according to
modern principles of freedom of contract unless proven otherwise.115
Perhaps the lack of controversy about section § 3.1 of the Restatement is
proof that the Restatement has, indeed, documented well-established
changes in the law of servitudes that have occurred over the course of the
twentieth century with the advent of common interest communities.116 As
with upholding the validity of covenants in common interest communities
and conservation servitudes, the Restatement’s shifting of the burden to
presume the validity of an affordability covenant greatly strengthens the
validity and enforceability of perpetual affordability covenants.
d.

The Restatement and Judicial Treatment Find
Affordability Covenants Valid Where Tradition
Common Law Suggests They are Not

Taken as a whole, the Restatement categorically improves the
enforceability of affordability covenants, including perpetual affordability
covenants, as compared to traditional common law. Not only does the
112. The Restatement declares this intention to shift the law of servitudes away from
archaic black letter law while “preserving the judiciary’s traditional role in protecting the
public interest in maintaining the social utility of land resources.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: SERVITUDES 3 Intro. Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000); Tarlock, supra note 96, at 821–
22 (“The primary goal of the Restatement (Servitudes) is to articulate a non-constitutional
standard of judicial review to address [lifestyle restrictions and restrictions that fail the
reasonableness test].”).
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. A (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
114. See id.; GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS,
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 8.02 (1990).
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
116. As the Restatement explains, “the view that the wide-spread use and judicial and
legislative acceptance of servitudes justifies a position that applies the concept of freedom
of contract to creation of servitudes is now generally accepted.” Id. See also Korngold,
supra note 114, § 10.01.
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Restatement reflect a fundamental shift toward upholding the validity of
all servitudes under principles of freedom of contract,117 but it also
eliminates the potential obstacles of horizontal privity,118 the touch and
concern doctrine,119 and the concern that perpetual affordability covenants
will be found invalid as direct restraints on alienation.120 Unfortunately,
judicial reliance on the Restatement has been slow to gain traction.121
Nonetheless, the common law of servitudes has evolved over nearly five
centuries.122 While relatively few cases so far have relied on the
Restatement’s treatment of the touch and concern doctrine, abolition of
horizontal privity, or unification of real covenants and equitable servitudes
with a presumption of validity,123 numerous courts have discussed or
considered the Restatement’s description of modern servitude law as it
pertains to these topics.124 Perhaps more significantly, a review of case law
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
118. See id. § 2.4.
119. See id. § 3.2.
120. See id. § 3.4.
121. Note, supra note 96, at 938 (“As of this writing, only one line of cases has used
the ALI’s new [public policy in lieu of the touch and concern] test.”). As of this writing,
only the Washington Court of Appeals has cited to the Restatement (Servitudes) § 2.4 in
support of the premise that privity is no longer required for the creation of a servitude. Lake
Limerick Country Club v. Hunt Mfg. Homes, Inc., 120 Wash. App. 246, 259 (2004). Only
courts in California and Texas have sited to the Restatement (Servitudes) § 3.1 in support
of the premise that servitudes are valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or contrary to public
policy. Cebular v. Cooper Arms Homeowners Ass’n, 142 Cal. App. 4th 106, 122 (2006);
Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 538 (Tex. Ct. App.
2008). No courts have cited or quoted the Restatement (Servitudes) § 3.2 to justify a claim
that the touch and concern doctrine has been superseded. Six states have relied on
Restatement (Servitudes) § 3.4 in determining whether a servitude was invalid as an
unreasonable direct restraint on alienation, however, none of the cases involved
affordability covenants. See Shaffer v. Bellows, 260 P.3d 1064, 1071–72 (Alaska 2011);
Dye v. Diamente, 510 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Ark. 2017); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil
and Gas Corp., 320 P.3d 1179, 1185 (Colo. 2014); Cape May Harbor Village & Yacht Club
Ass’n, Inc. v. Sbraga, 421 N.J. Super. 56, 71–74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011); Navasota
Resources, 249 S.W.3d at 538; SKI, Ltd. v. Mountainside Properties, Inc., 114 A.3d 1169,
1178–79 (Vt. 2015).
122. Most scholars trace the origins of real covenants at English common law to
Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
124. As of this writing, the following courts have discussed or considered the
Restatement’s position on the following: (1) that horizontal privity is no longer required
for a real covenant to run with the land; and (2) that servitudes are presumed valid. No
courts have discussed or considered the Restatement’s assertion that the touch-or-concern
doctrine has been superseded. Horizontal privity: In re Energytec, Inc., 739 F.3d 215, 222–
23 (5th Cir. 2013); Wykeman Rise, L.L.C. v. Federer, 52 A.3d 702, 714–15 (Conn. 2012);
Sonoma Dev., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579 (Va. 1999). Servitudes Presumed Valid:
First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122
(10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003); Clinger v. Hartshorn, 89 P.3d 462, 468
(Colo. App. 2003), Wykeman Rise, L.L.C. v. Federer, 52 A.3d 702, 714, 715 (Conn. 2012);
Grovenburg v. Rustle Meadow Assocs., L.L.C. 165 A.3d 193, 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017);
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related to affordability covenants suggests that courts tend to rule in
accordance with the Restatement regardless of whether they rely, discuss,
or even mention the Restatement.125 This suggests that at least as it pertains
to affordability covenants, the Restatement’s perspective on the state of
modern servitude law accurately reflects changing judicial norms about
the enforceability of servitudes. 126
B.

Affordability Covenants are Public Land Use Restrictions in
Function, Not Form

In the section above, the Article demonstrated how affordability
covenants often do not meet all necessary common law requirements to
“run with the land.” Although the Restatement approach significantly
improves the legitimacy of affordability covenants at common law, and
modern courts tend to enforce affordability covenants on public policy,
contract, or equitable principles, significant risk remains in relying on the
1515–19 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 43 P.3d 1233, 1238
(Wash. 2002).
125. The Restatement relies on Martin, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 632, in §3.4 comment h,
explaining that affordability covenants are not unreasonable restraints on alienation so long
as they are designed to further a legitimate purpose and the owner has a reasonable ability
to convey the restricted unit. ); see generally Oceanside v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d.
1420 (1989) The Restatement also relied on McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d. at 1420, in its
comment h to §3.4, explaining the test for determining whether an affordability covenant
is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. See also Columbus Park Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous.
Pres. & Dev., 598 N.E.2d 702, 707 (N.Y. 1992) (relying on contract justifications to uphold
multi-family rental housing affordability restrictions); Cannavaro v. Wash. Cmty. Hous.,
No. CV030091521S, 2005 WL 1433790, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 2005) (relying
on the Restatement in combining real covenants, easements, and equitable servitudes under
the single label “servitudes” and finding that servitudes can be validly created for the
benefit of third parties appurtenant or in gross); Tivoli Stock L.L.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of
Hous. Pres. Cmty. Dev., No. 108052/06, 2006 WL 3751468, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12,
2006) (relying on contract and public policy rationales in upholding affordability
restrictions); Fairfax Cty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. 108, 112–
13 (2009) (discussing the court’s desire, but lack of authority, to adopt the Restatement’s
supersession of the touch and concern doctrine, and deeming the doctrine satisfied because
of contract and public policy rationales attributed to the appurtenant burden); Nordbye v.
BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 225 (2011) (upholding running burden even
though the benefit is held in gross by municipality and by third party beneficiaries); 135
Wells Ave., L.L.C. v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 84 N.E.3d. 1257, 1267–68, 358–59 (Mass.
2017) (upholding the validity of an affordability covenant where the benefit was held in
gross by the municipality).
126. In the final words of the Martin v. Villa Roma decision, in justifying its decision
to uphold the affordability covenant at issue in the case, the California District Court of
Appeal stated that “[affordability covenants] are imposed pursuant to federal requirements
which, in any event, would take precedence over state law.” Martin, 131 Cal. App. 3d at
635 (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981)). This off-hand justification for
affordability covenants based in federal preemption has not been raised by other courts,
legislatures, the Restatement, or other scholarly work, therefore, a thorough analysis of the
claim is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is certainly an intriguing topic worthy
of further investigation.
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common law of property to ensure judicial enforceability of these
servitudes. This Article next turns to public land use law as a possible
means of shoring the enforcement of affordability covenants and other
public/private land use devices.
Zoning is fundamentally a public land use restriction.127 The Supreme
Court defined zoning as “the general plan by which the city's territory is
allotted to different uses . . . .”128 The Court upheld the constitutionality of
zoning, generally, as a legitimate exercise of the state police power even
though zoning necessarily means restricting the uses and, potentially, the
value of privately owned real property.129 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
Ambler Realty challenged the validity of a municipality’s zoning
ordinance, generally, arguing that any municipal regime that seeks to
restrict Ambler’s land use rights as a private property was a violation of
Ambler’s substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.130 In upholding the municipality’s zoning ordinance, which
created exclusive, single family residential zones and other, more
inclusive zones, the Court concluded that the municipality’s exercise of
the police power in generally creating the zoning ordinance was not
arbitrary or unreasonable.131 However, the Court left open the possibility
of finding a specific zoning ordinance arbitrary or unreasonable when
weighed against a specific harm to an individual landowner.132
Since the early twentieth century more than 97% of cities with 5,000
or more residents have enacted zoning ordinances.133 To protect against
further constitutional challenges, states and municipalities typically adhere
to relatively uniform procedural safeguards.134 For example, all 50 states
have passed zoning enabling legislation that empowers municipalities
within the state to implement a zoning regime.135 The vast majority of state
enabling legislation is based on the Standard State Zoning Enabling
127. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 517–21.
128. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926).
129. Id. at 395.
130. See id. at 383–84.
131. See id. at 392, 395.
132. See id. at 395–96.
133. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alt. to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 692 (1973); BARLOW BURKE,
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 87 (2d ed. 2009).
134. See BURKE, supra note 133, at 85.
135. See DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 27, at 982–83; see Ellickson, supra note
133, at 691–92; BURKE, supra note 133, at 87. In addition, according to the drafters of the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, “[a] general State enabling act is always advisable,
and while the power to zone may, in some States, be derived from constitutional as
distinguished from statutory home rule, still it is seldom that the home-rule power will
cover all the necessary provisions for successful zoning.” STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT (1928) (reprinted in AM. LAW INST., MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968) https://bit.ly/2kJm2eQ.
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Legislation, which was first published as a suggestion for states by the
United States Department of Commerce in 1924.136 These state enabling
statutes not only authorize municipalities to create zoning ordinances that
segregate land according to use and area restrictions,137 but they also
establish a uniform regulatory framework to be carried out by two
regulatory bodies, a zoning commission138 and a board of zoning
adjustment,139 to ensure that due process is protected in the municipal
exercise of the zoning power.140 Both the ordinance enactment and
proceedings of the administrative bodies are usually subject to additional
administrative procedures to safeguard the constitutionality of the
municipal action. For example, passage or amendment of the zoning
ordinance may be subject to public notice and comment or hearings.141
Additionally, hearings held by the zoning commission and the board of
zoning adjustment are typically subject to procedural due process
requirements such as the right to notice, the right to cross examine
witnesses, and the right to appeal.142
1.

Formalistic
Differences
Covenants and Zoning

Between

Affordability

At first blush, perpetual affordability covenants and zoning seem to
be quite dissimilar enterprises.143 This stems from their formalistic
differences.144 After all, perpetual affordability covenants arise under
contract, by mutual consent of the contracting parties, as a private
agreement to restrict the use of a specific piece of real estate. In contrast,
zoning is a public legislative and administrative process that sets

136. DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 27, at 982–83; see STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT (1928) (reprinted in AM. LAW INST., MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968)
137. For example, in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, “[t]he legislative body
of [municipalities] is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percent of lot that may be occupied,
the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location
and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes
. . . .” Id.. . . .” STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1928) (reprinted in AM. LAW
INST., MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210 Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968)
138. The legislative body appoints a zoning commission “to recommend boundaries
of the various original districts and appropriate regulations to be enforced therein.” Id. at
217.
139. The board of adjustment may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate
conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance.
Id. at 218.
140. See BURKE, supra note 133, at 76.
141. See id. at 85.
142. See id. at 157.
143. See 5 RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §82.2 (4th ed. (2019)).
144. See id.
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parameters for land uses across an entire municipality in accordance with
an overarching comprehensive plan intended to serve the long-term public
interest of the jurisdiction.145
Beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, however, zoning
innovations have begun to look more like private land use arrangements
in form.146 For example, zoning regulations for overlay districts are “often
equally as detailed as the private covenants seen in suburban
subdivisions.”147 Zoning for specific projects, as in Planned Unit
Development approvals and conditional zoning, are often negotiated like
private contracts.148 These types of innovative, non-Euclidean, zones are
intended to give zoning administrators both more flexibility and control
over permitted uses on discreet parcels of land.149 For example, mandatory
Inclusionary Zoning laws typically require developers to set aside a
portion of their developments as affordable housing and in exchange
provide the developments with economic benefits like density bonuses or
tax exemptions.150
At the same time, affordability covenants are beginning to look a bit
more like public land use restrictions in that they are often required by
statute or regulation and are based on templates provided by the
municipality with little room for negotiation.151 Similarly, many
affordable housing “deals” which give rise to affordability covenants are
imbued with a certain halo of procedural due process in that developers of
subsidized housing often compete for public subsidy and are selected by a
public body in accordance with published selection criteria and a
jurisdictional plan.152 In addition to obtaining zoning entitlements by a
zoning commission, to win competitions for public resources, affordable
housing developments must often show compatibility with other types of
municipal planning, such as an agency affordable housing plan, a smart
growth plan, or a comprehensive plan.153

145. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 517–21.
146. See Noah Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Governments’ Use of
Covenants to Regulate Land Use, 124 YALE L.J. 1790, 1801 (2015).
147. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 719
(2010).
148. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 625–27.
149. See BURKE, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROP. LAW 785 (2015).
150. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated
Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 906 (2006).
151. See, e.g., New Jersey’s Model Affordability Covenant, N.J.A.C. 5:80-26 App.
A (2004).
152. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30(g) (West 2017).
153. See, e.g., CITY OF N.Y, DEP’T. OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., 2018 LOW INCOME HOUS.
TAX CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 20 (2018); KATHLEEN PATTERSON, LOWRANKED PROJECTS SECURE AFFORDABLE HOUSING FUNDS, A REPORT BY THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA AUDITOR (May 30, 2019), https://bit.ly/2kz6DOk (criticizing the lack of
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Functional Similarities Between Affordability Covenants
and Zoning

The formalistic differences between affordability covenants and
zoning may obscure the more important functional similarities. When a
public body sets about assembling a privately-owned stock of perpetually
affordable housing, the public body is implementing a system of public
land use control. The municipality is allocating public resources for the
purpose of creating a public benefit – a durable stock of affordable
housing. As discussed above, the courts that have enforced affordability
covenants have occasionally grappled with the ill-fitting requirements for
real covenants and equitable servitudes,154 but have typically relied,
implicitly or explicitly, on the legitimate public purpose the covenant is
intended to further. 155 One of the clearest articulations of this public policy
justification can be found in the California Supreme Court’s rationale for
upholding the City of San Jose’s Inclusionary Zoning ordinance where the
Court drew a parallel between the broad police power of a jurisdiction to
engage in zoning and the broad police power of a jurisdiction to impose
affordability restrictions through an Inclusionary Zoning ordinance.156
Notably, the case is argued and decided in the headier plane of deciding
whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power or a
regulatory taking; there is no discussion of the functional validity of the
servitudes required by the ordinance to secure the on-going affordability
of subject units.157
In the rare instances where courts have considered the functional
validity of affordability covenants, some courts have nevertheless resorted
to public policy rationales for finding the covenants enforceable rather
than applying the common law tests for running covenants or equitable
servitudes. For example, in Martin v. Villa Roma and Oceanside v.
McKenna, the California Court of Appeals concluded that affordability
covenants are not void as unreasonable restraints on alienation because
“they support rather than offend the policies of [California].”158 In Reikse,
transparency in awarding funds to affordable housing developers without a transparent
process).
154. Oceanside v. McKenna, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1426 (1989); Columbus Park
Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 598 N.E.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. 1992); Cannavaro v.
Wash. Cmty. Hous., No. CV030091521S, 2005 WL 1433790, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 23, 2005); Tivoli Stock L.L.C., 2006 WL 3751468, at *6; Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. at 110–
14; Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 225 (2011).; 135 Wells Ave.,
L.L.C., 84 N.E.3d. at 1268–69.
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
156. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1000 (Cal. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
157. Id.
158. Martin v. Villa Roma, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635 (1982); McKenna, 215
Cal. App. 3d at 1428.
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the court grappled with the specific requirements for real covenants and
equitable servitudes at common law.159 After lamenting its lack of
authority to adopt the Restatement’s position superseding the “touch and
concern” requirement for real covenants, the court went on to pointedly
interpret the touch and concern requirement broadly enough to encompass
an affordability restriction to which the county housing development
agency is a party.160 The Reikse court explained that a narrow
interpretation of the touch and concern requirement would have resulted
in frustrating the legislative intent of the state’s affordable housing
statute.161 As discussed above, in California Building Industry Ass’n, the
court upheld an Inclusionary Zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the
police power without analyzing the validity of the tools intended to secure
the affordability of individual units. The court in Tivoli Stock L.L.C. v.
N.Y.C Department of Housing and Community Devevelopment, makes it
clear that an agency’s decision regarding the release of a specific covenant
is also action pursuant to the police power, subject to rational basis review
like other quasi-legislative actions related to zoning.162 Of course, ensuring
the provision of decent, safe, and affordable housing has been recognized
as a legitimate public policy objective for governmental agencies since
1934.163 However, courts have not yet directly and decisively addressed
the fundamental legitimacy of a public land use control system based on
affordability covenants.
C.

Affordability Covenants Belong Among a Set of New,
“Hybrid” Public/Private Land Use Controls

The sections above showed that affordability covenants are neither
real covenants nor public land use controls. Instead, they are some kind of
hybrid. In this subsection, the Article reviews the literature related to other
“hybrid” public/private land use devices such as conservation servitudes,
conditional zoning, and development agreements to better understand this
unconventional set of devices.
When a municipality uses private, negotiated agreements, such as
covenants, to allocate public resources or to issue conditional zoning or
permitting approvals, it can be difficult to ascertain whether the
municipality is exercising its contracting power or its police power.164
159. See Riekse, 78 Va. Cir. at 109–11. (2009).
160. Id. at 112–13.
161. Id.
162. Tivoli Stock L.L.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., No. 108052/06,
2006 WL 3751468, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2006).
163. National Housing Act of 1943, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934); United States Housing Act
of 1937, 50 Stat. 888 (1937); see, e.g., 2910 Ga. Ave. L.L.C. v. District of Columbia et al.,
234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 312 (2017).
164. See Wegner, supra note 28, at 958.

ART 2 - PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS

10/22/2019 4:09 PM

87

Depending on how state contract and police powers are blended, municipal
action can be “basically legitimate or fundamentally flawed.”165
Property and land use law scholar, Professor Judith Welch Wegner,
examines this question in two contexts. First, she addresses the use of
contingent zoning, where a jurisdiction agrees to rezone a parcel of land
contingent upon the landowner’s entering into agreements or covenants
with other parties to develop the land in a specific way. Second, she
examines, the use of development agreements, where a public body agrees
to provide public benefits, such as land, financing, or tax relief, to a
developer in exchange for the developer’s promises related to a
development project or off-site improvements.166 Professor Wegner
concludes that crucial to the success of these “hybrid” land use devices is
the articulation of substantive standards, codified in state legislation and
local ordinances, about when and how the tools are to be used,167 and
procedural standards including public participation and judicial
oversight.168
Conservation servitudes have also been described as “hybrid” land
use devices. 169 Environmental law scholar Professor Jessica Owley has
described conservation servitudes as “hybrids of property law, contract
law and zoning.”170 Environmental science scholars Mary Ann King and
Professor Sally Fairfax have described conservation easements as “blurred
mosaics of public and private land ownership and management
priorities.”171 Conservation easements have much in common with
affordability covenants. Like affordability covenants, conservation
servitudes are a later-twentieth century innovation that do not satisfy
common law requirements for real covenants or equitable servitudes
because the benefit of the servitude is held in-gross and they are often of

165. Id. at 965.
166. See id. at 961–62.
167. See id. at 1014.
168. See id. at 986–88.
169. Conservation servitudes are also sometimes called conservation easements or
restrictions. As explained by Gerald Korngold, these private land use restrictions in-gross
most closely resemble the traditional definition of servitudes, so that is what they are called
throughout this paper. See Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 436–
37. Notably, the drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”), adopted
by 23 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia, explicitly rejects this
approach and maintains that they are easements, not real covenants or equitable servitudes.
See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1980) (amended 2007).
170. Owley, supra note 23, at 137.
171. Mary Ann King & Sally Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation
Easements: Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 65, 69 (2006).
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perpetual duration.172 Moreover, their creation is encouraged by federal
law,173 and they appear to put unreasonable restraints on alienation.174
Unlike affordability covenants, scholars have been quite concerned with
ensuring the enforceability of conservation servitudes since the early
1980s.175 This scholarly attention may be due, in part, to the significant
amount of litigation involving conservation servitudes and their
enforcement.176
As environmental law scholar Peter Morrisette explains:
Because the common law of servitudes does not provide for negative
easements or servitudes held in gross that run with the land in perpetuity,
states have enacted enabling statutes that provide for conservation
easements. These statutes eliminate many of the common law
impediments to conservation easements—such as the restriction against
negative easements held in gross, as well as privity, and touch and
concern requirements.177

Indeed, to ensure the validity of conservation servitudes, given their
shortcomings in meeting common law servitude requirements, at least 37
states have passed conservation easement statutes,178 25 of them based on
the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”).179
The UCEA is short and simple.180 Its purpose is limited to “sweeping
away certain common law impediments that might otherwise undermine a
conservation easement’s validity.”181 The drafters of the UCEA intended
that states would insert the act into their property laws as enabling
legislation.182 Indeed, 23 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of
172. To receive federal income tax benefits, a conservation easement must be
perpetual. 26 U.S.C. §170(h)(5)(A) (2019).
173. The federal tax code creates a tax benefit for land subject to perpetual
conservation easements. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2019).
174. Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 455. As with
Affordability Covenants, the Restatement creates a specific exemption for conservation
servitudes in its rule related to unreasonable restraints on alienation. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
175. See Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 433; see also
Owley, supra note 23, at 121; King & Fairfax, supra note 171, at 65.
176. As an illustration, Massachusetts has a single enabling statute for conservation,
preservation, and affordable housing restrictions that run with the land. 184 MASS. GEN.
LAWS § 32 (2019). Of the 35 cases related to this statute as of the date of writing this article,
26 related to conservation restrictions, 9 related to agricultural preservation restrictions,
and only 1 related tangentially to affordable housing restrictions. Id.
177. Morrisette, supra note 23, at 384.
178. Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 438.
179. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980)
(amended 2007).
180. Id.
181. Id. § 3.
182. Id.
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Columbia have done just that.183 The other 27 states have enacted their
own conservation easement enabling legislation.184 In contrast, only 6
states have passed similar statutes intended to ensure the validity of
affordable housing covenants, there is no uniform or model act.185
In sum, long-term affordability covenants are “hybrid” public/private
land use devices similar to the contingent zoning, development
agreements, and conservation servitudes. However, in these other
“hybrid” forms, concern about common law validity has led to significant
progress in enacting state enabling legislation. While all jurisdictions
require the use of affordability covenants as conditions for receipt of
public subsidy, only 6 states have passed legislation explicitly authorizing
affordability covenants as a valid device regardless of common law
obstacles to their enforceability described above.
D.

Summary and Segue from Law to Policy

As Professor Gerald Korngold has explained, public ownership of
land is significantly more expensive than public restriction of that land
through private, opt-in land use controls like servitudes.186 Federal
affordable housing policy has embraced this shift to privately owned,
privately restricted housing since the Johnson administration187 by capping
the growth of publicly owned public housing programs and pivoting to

183. Id.
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Ch. 161); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-101 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 6902 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 704.05 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-1 (2019);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §198-1 (2019); 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 33/1 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 101-65); IOWA CODE ANN. § 457A (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:1271 (1987);2018); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROPERTY § 2-118
(amended 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,111 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31–32 (West, Westlaw through ch. 64 except
ch. 47 of the 2019 Annual Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 324.8204 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Reg. Sess. No. 47); MO. ANN. STAT. §442.014 (West, Westlaw through 2019
Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-201 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 477:45 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Ch. 175); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 5:80-26.1 (2019); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSER. LAW § 49-0301 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
113A-230 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 61-15-04 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5301.63 (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §49.1 (2019); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 3439.1 et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Ch. 310); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9301 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-1 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess.); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 610 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.4.130 & 76.09.040 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
185. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
186. Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 23, at 461.
187. See generally Alexander von Hoffman, History Lessons for Today’s Housing
Policy: The Political Process of Making Low-Income Housing Policy 26 (Joint Center for
Housing Studies, Harvard Univ. 2012).
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publicly subsidized but privately owned housing.188 While affordability
covenants are generally used as private land use control devices to secure
public investment, they oftentimes fail to satisfy the requirements for
enforceability according to common law property rules. The limited case
law on the enforceability of these covenants suggests that courts are
inclined to overlook these common law deficiencies and enforce the
covenants on public policy grounds, at least for the time being.
Indeed, the valid public purpose and furtherance of public policy
objectives belie a formal characterization of these covenants as private
land use restrictions. They are better characterized as a hybrid of public
and private land use restrictions, like environmental servitudes, contingent
zoning, and development agreements. State legislatures and localities
often overcome the shortcoming of conservation easements, contingent
zoning, and development agreements as private land use devices by
bolstering the instruments as public land use devices. In other words,
legislatures and localities legitimize the exercise of state police and
contract power through specific enabling legislation and regulations
intended to institute substantive and procedural due process safeguards.
Such bolstering of affordability covenants as public land use devices is
uncommon; without it, covenants intended to secure billions of dollars of
public investment may be found unenforceable. The next part of this
Article analyzes the six existing affordability covenant enabling statutes,
together with the UCEA, to address some of the basic substantive concerns
that an affordability covenant enabling statute should address.
III. ENABLING LEGISLATION IS ESSENTIAL TO SECURE THE VALIDITY
OF AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS
Part II of this Article takes a critical look at what enabling legislation,
as a tool of public land use restriction, must do to achieve its purpose in
creating valid and enforceable perpetual affordability covenants. It begins
with an analysis of the six existing affordability covenant enabling statutes
and the UCEA. This Article concludes that although the existing
affordability covenant enabling acts are certainly better than nothing, mere
codification may defer (but not resolve) the legitimate problems that
affordability covenants create as private land use restrictions. Rather,
enabling legislation should first distinguish the state contract and police
power being implemented and then provide procedural and substantive
due process to support the valid use of these state powers. The parameters
of these powers are first sketched by looking to zoning and regulatory
takings jurisprudence. Finally, this Article considers two different
fundamental policy goals within the parameters of enforceability that
188. Id. at 46.
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policymakers should choose between. One goal is aimed at suppressing
the value of affordability-covenant-restricted properties to essentially
remove those properties from the mainstream real estate market. The other
goal is to not necessarily remove affordability covenant restricted
properties from the mainstream market, but instead to carve off and
capture the market value of the covenant for the benefit of the
municipality.
A.

The UCEA Provides a Framework for Affordability
Covenant Enabling Statutes

The UCEA has been enormously influential in educating and
mobilizing states about the need for state enabling statutes to ensure the
enforceability of conservation easements. It has been so successful, in fact,
that at least one state has looked to the UCEA as a model for affordability
covenant enabling legislation.189 The UCEA provides some useful
guidance to states and localities in legitimizing the public land use aspect
of hybrid land use devices, first and foremost, by confronting the fact that
these hybrid devices are vulnerable to judicial findings of invalidity at
common law and remedying that problem with enabling legislation.190 In
attempting to design a model statute that can be easily adopted by all
states, the UCEA drafters followed several guiding principles. First, they
limited the act to achieving one limited, but most essential, goal191 (namely
curing deficiencies of conservation easements at common law via enabling
legislation). Second, the uniform act is short and simple. The first principle
makes the second principle possible. Everything in the UCEA is necessary
to achieve the first principle but goes no further.192 Third, to the extent that
the uniform act must define terms, it does so only in furtherance of the first
principle. The intent behind the second and third principles is to encourage
states to adopt the law with few revision and to insert it, specifically, into
the state’s property laws193 so that there is uniformity between state laws
and, hopefully, greater interstate judicial conformity of interpretation.194
189. See M.R.S. 33 §§ 121–26 (1991).
190. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1980) (amended 2007).
191. Id. (“The Act has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away certain
common law impediments which might otherwise undermine the easements’ validity,
particularly those held in gross.”)
192. Id. (“The Act does not address a number of issues which, though of conceded
importance, are considered extraneous to its primary objective of enabling private parties
to enter into consensual arrangements with charitable organizations or governmental
bodies to protect land and buildings without the encumbrance of certain potential common
law impediments.”)
193. Id. § 3. (“[T]he Act is intended to be placed in the real property law of adopting
states . . . .”)
194. Id. § 6.

ART 2 - PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY COVENANTS (DO NOT DELETE)

92

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:09 PM

[Vol. 124:1

The UCEA does not explicitly address the public land use aspects of
conservation easements, but treats conservation easements as private
agreements where the holder of the covenant happens to be limited to
charitable organizations and governmental bodies who must consent to
any obligations or duties related to the benefit of the easement.195
In commentary, the drafters of the UCEA explained that a public
process was intentionally omitted so as not to create a chilling effect on
the creation of conservation easements through a mandated governmental
approval process.196 The drafters rationalized their decision and explained
that any eligible beneficiary of a conservation easement would likely have
an administrative process related to accepting obligations contained in an
easement.197 Nevertheless, the drafters of the UCEA implicitly assumed
that the justification for the validity of these easements was to serve the
public interest.198
Though conservation easements and affordability covenants both
seem to fit into the new constellation of hybrid public/private land use
devices, there are some notable differences between the tools. For
example, the drafters of the UCEA were concerned that a public process
would have a chilling effect on the creation of conservation servitudes.199
In contrast, affordability covenants are created as a precondition to
something a developer seeks from a public body (land, financing, zoning
or permitting approval) in accordance with a public processes pre-existing
the affordability covenants. The concern that a public process related to
the affordability covenant would have a chilling effect on the creation of
affordability covenants is unfounded. However, precisely because
affordability covenants are a product of the public contract and police
powers, they may be more likely attacked as regulatory takings or as
unconscionable.
At least two jurisdictions, Maine and Massachusetts, are aware of the
similarities between conservation servitudes and affordability covenants.
Maine’s affordability covenant statute closely tracks the UCEA and
appears to have used the UCEA as its template.200 For example, the statute
has a mere six sections that match the titles of the UCEA sections,201 it is
located in Maine’s property law,202 it is limited in scope to defining certain
195. Id. § 2(b).
196. Id. at prefatory note.
197. Id.
198. Id. § 2 (“[E]asements may be created only for certain purposes intended to serve
the public interest . . . .”)
199. Id. at prefatory note.
200. See M.R.S. 33 §§ 121–26 (1991); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT,
prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) (amended 2007).
201. M.R.S. 33 §§ 121–26 (1991).
202. Id.
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key terms and to enabling affordability covenants by overriding common
law impediments to enforcement,203 and it limits “qualified holders” of the
benefit of a covenant to certain kinds of governmental bodies and
nonprofit organizations.204 Likewise, Massachusetts acknowledges the
similarities between affordability covenants and conservation,
preservation, and agricultural servitudes by defining them together in the
same statute as “restrictions.”205 Massachusetts has also exempted them
from the validity requirements of more traditional servitudes,206 legislated
over common law impediments to enforcement,207 instituted due process
safeguards to protect the public interest,208 and created a combined
recording index for these public interest restrictions.209
Other jurisdictions with affordability covenant enabling legislation
also seem to have recognized the similarities between these covenants and
the UCEA. For example, when the Oregon legislature passed its
affordability covenant enabling act in 2007, it recognized that although
affordability covenants are being implemented in the state, without
specific enabling legislation, the covenants were vulnerable to judicial
challenge.210 The Oregon statute, along with Rhode Island’s affordability
covenant enabling act, seems to be modeled after the UCEA. Specifically,
the Oregon and Rhode Island acts are inserted in the state housing laws,211
define affordability covenants,212 address who has standing to enforce
affordability covenants,213 and specifically declare affordability covenants
valid despite inconsistences with common law requirements.214
California’s affordability covenant enabling act is tied to the creation
of its Low and Moderate Income Housing Trust Fund215 and simply makes
the affordability covenants required in the section binding on the
covenanter and all successors “[n]otwithstanding any other law.”216
Vermont’s enabling act is almost as simple as California’s. It is located in
203. See ME. STAT. tit. 33, §§ 121, 122, 124 (1991).
204. See ME. STAT. tit. 33, § 121(3) (1991).
205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (West 1990).
206. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 26 (West 1990).
207. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 1990).
208. See id.
209. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 33 (West 1990).
210. See H.R. 3485c, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
211. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 456.270–.295 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 34-39.1-1 et seq. (West 1991).
212. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.270 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3439.1-3 (West 1991).
213. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.280–285 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 34-39.1-3 (West 2006).
214. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.290 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3439.1-4 (West 2006).
215. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f).
216. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f)(7).
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Vermont’s marketable title act.217 After defining what an affordability
covenant is,218 it simply states that the covenant shall be enforceable
according to its terms.219
Unquestionably, the six states that have passed affordability covenant
enabling legislation have taken a significant step in shoring the
enforceability of their states’ affordability covenants. Interestingly, there
has been virtually no litigation involving these six enabling acts.220 While
two of the enabling acts include legislative findings or purpose sections to
establish the public purpose that justifies the use of the state police power
in creating the act,221 only one jurisdiction seems to have followed the
example of the UCEA in eschewing creation of a public processes in their
enabling acts and treating these enabling acts as essentially legislative
inoculation for private land use agreements.222
The fear of chilling the creation of conservation easements, the
reason the UCEA drafters avoided discussion of a public process as
discussed above, is inapplicable to affordability covenants where
participation in a public process antecedes the covenant. Public land use
jurisprudence suggests that rather than ignoring the public process
involved in the creation of affordability covenants, jurisdictions should
articulate a public process that establishes substantive and procedural due
process safeguards to assist the judiciary in upholding the acts should they
be challenged in court. 223
B.

Parameters of the Public Police and Contract Powers

In her excellent essay, “Moving Toward the Bargaining Table:
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals,” Professor Wegner takes her
readers on a deep dive into the theoretical underpinnings of public/private
land use arrangements.224 Professor Wegner considers two kinds of
public/private land use arrangements, or “deals,” contingent zoning, and
217. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 610 (West 1995).
218. See id. § 610(a).
219. See id. § 610(e).
220. There are two Vermont cases related to property tax assessed values of restricted
properties. See generally Franks v. Town of Essex, 87 A.3d 418 (Vt. 2013); Laterre House
Ltd. v. Town of Wilmington, No. 2001–341, 2002 WL 34423628, at *1 (Vt. 2002). Of the
35 cases related to Massachusetts’s restriction enabling statute, only one is tangentially
related to affordability covenants. See City of Boston v. Roxbury Action Program, Inc.,
862 N.E.2d 763, 766–67 n. 8, 9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
221. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.275 (West 2010); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3439.1-2 (West 2006).
222. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.275 (West 2010)
223. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474–75
(Fla. 1993).
224. See Wegner, supra note 28, at 957.
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development agreements.225 She insightfully notes that in entering into
these public/private deals, jurisdictions are exercising a blend of contract
power and police power.226 Professor Wegner looks to the reserved powers
doctrine of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution to define
the parameters of legitimate state contract/police action in land use
deals.227 She notes that where state action is found to violate the reserved
powers doctrine, there is (1) the absence of reasonably clear government
authority, (2) marginal or unwarranted private expectations (for example,
about the role of the public body and its regulatory duties or authority to
contract), and (3) a strong, circumstance- and time-dependent public
interest that has been affected adversely.228 In parsing judicial reception of
contingent zoning and development agreements, Professor Wegner finds
that when these public/private deals have been upheld, they have satisfied
the test outlined above with procedural and substantive safeguards. For
example, procedural safeguards for contingent zoning and development
agreements include procedures defined by statutes or ordinances, notice
and hearing requirements, super-majority voting, recordation, and an
independent legislative body.229 Substantive safeguards include
conformity with a comprehensive plan and other legitimate public land use
goals.230
Professor Wegner’s delineation of the parameters of the legitimate
exercise of the public contract and police powers in public/private land use
deals is further informed by the United States Supreme Court development
exactions cases of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,231 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.232 Nollan and Dolan
are both cases where property owners were asked by local permitting
authorities to give up an interest in their land in exchange for building
permit approval.233 In holding the easement requirement in Nollan an
unconstitutional taking, the Supreme Court explained that there must be a
nexus between the condition or property interest sought by the government
authority and the problem caused by the proposed development that must

225. Id.
226. See id. at 965.
227. See id. at 965–68.
228. See id. at 967.
229. See id. at 986–88, 1009.
230. See Wegner, supra note 28, at 989.
231. See generally Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
232. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
233. The Nollans were asked to grant a public easement along their private beachfront
parallel with the ocean as a condition to getting a residential building permit. Nollan, 483
U.S. at 828. Similarly, Ms. Dolan was asked to dedicate part of her land to the city for flood
control and a public bike path as a condition to getting a commercial building permit.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379–80.
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be alleviated.234 Dolan extends Nollan one more logical step—not only
must there be a qualitative relationship between the condition sought by
the governmental body and the problem caused by the proposed
development that must be alleviated, but there must be a quantitative
nexus, or “rough proportionality,” between the condition sought and the
harm created by the development.235 For example, in Dolan, the Supreme
Court found the city failed to demonstrate that the public greenway it
demanded from Dolan in exchange for a building permit would
proportionally off-set or alleviate the amount of increased traffic that
Dolan’s development was projected to cause.236
The existing affordability covenant enabling acts accurately describe
the covenants as interests in land granted to either governmental bodies or
certain non-profit housing organizations in exchange for zoning or
permitting approval or public funds. In addition to Professor Wegner’s
observation that public/private land deals should be supported by
procedural and substantive safeguards, affordability covenant enabling
legislation should also include safeguards to ensure that the conditions and
restrictions imposed by affordability covenants are qualitatively and
quantitatively justifiable in relation to the impact of the development.
Although courts have rejected the assertion that mandated production of
deed-restricted affordable housing pursuant to an Inclusionary Zoning
statute is subject to Nollan/Dolan analysis,237 Justice Thomas has made
clear his dissatisfaction with what he considers an arbitrary distinction
between legislative action and executive action in classifying takings.238
After considering how enabling legislation should legitimize the
combined public contracting and police powers at play in affordability
covenants, the final sections of this Article explore two different
fundamental policy goals for creating a perpetual affordability covenant
land use regime.
C.

Affordability Covenant Enabling Statutes Face a Unique
Question Regarding Their Essential Policy Goal

For conservation easements, the essential goal underlying the
creation of this public/private land use tool is to enable the creation of a
stock of privately owned, permanently restricted parcels of real estate that

234. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
235. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395–96.
236. See id. at 395.
237. 2910 Ga. Ave., L.L.C. v. District of Columbia et al., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 299,
305 (D.D.C. 2017); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 991 (Cal.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
238. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. at 928–29.
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preserves open green space or natural habitat in perpetuity.239 This “real
estate stock” approach is baked into federal tax incentives, which only
apply to lands subject to perpetual conservation easements.240 It is also
baked into the UCEA, which assumes that a conservation easement is
“unlimited in duration” unless otherwise specified.241 For the handful of
jurisdictions currently imposing permanent affordability covenants on
privately owned but publicly subsidized affordable housing property, the
underlying purpose seems similarly oriented toward creating a permanent
stock of real estate that will be limited to use as affordable housing
forever.242 Under this view, the jurisdiction’s goal is long-term
suppression of the value of the property subject to the covenant.243 This
Article will refer to this as the “value suppression approach.” However,
there is another essential policy goal that can serve as the foundation for
perpetual affordability restrictions. That is, creating a portfolio of fungible
interests in land to be owned by the municipality as capital assets.244 This
Article will refer to this second approach as the “value capture approach.”
This section explores the benefits and drawbacks of each essential policy
goal and their ramifications for enabling statutes.
1.

Value Suppression Approach
a.

Benefits of the Value Suppression Approach

There are many benefits associated with the value suppression
approach to perpetual affordability covenants. By effectively removing a
piece of real estate from the general market, a jurisdiction need not
239. There are legal scholars who question the wisdom of allowing conservation
easements in perpetuity. See Owley, supra note 23, at 121. However, the clear trend is that
conservation easements are created with perpetual terms to qualify for the federal tax
deduction.
240. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2017).
241. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 2(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980)
(amended 2007).
242. See COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, LONG-TERM HOUSING AFFORDABILITY FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4–10 (2017), https://bit.ly/2QEVg2X (discussing Boston’s
long-term capital reinvestment approach to its perpetually restricted, privately owned
affordable housing stock); see also Stephanie Sosa, HPD Takes An Important Step
Forward for “Permanent Affordability,” ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., INC.
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2JOwVHf; see also PHIL MENDELSON, REPORT ON PR21-125,
“965 FLORIDA AVE., N.W., DISPOSITION APPROVAL RESOLUTION OF 2015,” P.R. Doc. No.
21–125, at 6–7 (2015), https://bit.ly/2Wce62i.
243. See Permanent Affordability: Practical Solutions, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD &
HOUS. DEV., INC. WHITE PAPER 8 (2015), https://bit.ly/2IficSv (“[U]p to 30% of . . . subsidy
is spent on preserving the affordability of existing projects. And much of this subsidy is
. . . put toward compensating the property owners for the increased property values, in
order to compete with the private market.”).
244. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.);
see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.280(6) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).
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compete in a gentrifying market merely to preserve existing housing
stock.245 The Chinatown preservation conundrum at the beginning of this
Article is averted.246 By locking in specific pieces of real estate as
perpetually affordable, maintaining housing for low-income residents in
perpetuity, economic and (potentially) cultural diversity is preserved.
A perpetual affordability covenant’s effectiveness at suppressing
market value of the burdened real estate will be dependent upon the
likelihood of release of the covenant. At common law, covenants are
released upon merger, formal release, expiration, laches, estoppel,
abandonment, acquiescence, prescription, unclean hands, or upon a
finding of changed conditions.247 A covenant may also be terminated due
to a marketable title act.248 Creating an affordability covenant with a
perpetual term obviously eliminates the possibility of termination by
expiration of term. Legislation enabling perpetual affordability covenants
should seek to limit these common law and statutory methods of releasing
to the greatest extent practicable. For example, the UCEA and the Maine
Affordable Housing Covenant Act, which is based on the UCEA, both
provide that the easement or covenant enabled by the act can be terminated
in the same ways as other easements or covenants,249 and that courts are
empowered to modify or terminate covenants in accordance with the
principles of law and equity.250 This language preserves the ability for
covenants to be terminated in all ways except expiration of term.
A jurisdiction adopting a value suppression model should design its
statute to make covenant termination difficult. This can be done directly,
by eliminating accidental forms of termination, such as prescription and
laches, and by placing high procedural hurdles on termination by release.
For example, in Massachusetts, an affordability covenant can only be
released by the Department of Housing following a public hearing, a
determination of the public interest and accordance with the
comprehensive plan, and payment by the burdened party to repurchase the
property interest created by the covenant.251

245. See Permanent Affordability: Practical Solutions, supra note 243, at 8.
246. See Phil Mendelson, supra note 242, at 6–7.
247. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 927.
248. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 900 (eighteen states have
“marketable record title” acts that simply make void any recorded document older than a
statutorily defined number of years, typically between 20 and 40 years).
249. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1980) (amended 2007). ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §122.1 (West, Westlaw through 2018
Sess.).
250. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, §3(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1980) (amended 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 123.3 (West, Westlaw through
2018).
251. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
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Termination of a covenant can also be made more difficult indirectly
by granting broad standing for enforcement. For example, in Nordbye v.
BRCP/GM Ellington, the local housing agency and all past, present, and
future tenants of the housing complex who met income criteria for
residency in the affordable housing complex had standing to enforce the
affordability restrictions applicable to the housing complex.252 The court
concluded that the housing agency’s written consent to release the
affordability covenant did not prevent income eligible past, present, or
future tenants from enforcing the covenant.253
b.

Value Suppression Approach Drawbacks

There are numerous costs or potential problems associated with the
value suppression approach. The first problem is potentially chilling
private investment. The shift from publicly owned to privately owned
affordable housing in the latter half of the twentieth century sprung from
a desire to encourage private financing as much as possible so that public
funds merely leverage private investment and fill funding gaps between
project costs and what private financial institutions are willing to
finance.254 Today, most private financing of affordable housing is
privately underwritten assuming that unrestricted, market rate rents, or
resale values will be available upon foreclosure or certain other
extraordinary scenarios.255 If permanent affordability covenants are
intended to permanently move real estate into a separate, value restricted
class of property, the amount of private funding available per project may
reflect this change and result in the need for greater public subsidy.
Indeed, advocates for perpetual restrictions and affordable housing
providers in Boston have confirmed that perpetual covenants reduce the
amount of private financing available for initial construction as well as
capital replacements–requiring greater public subsidy at initial
construction and throughout the life of the project.256 This results in the
creation and preservation of fewer units of affordable housing in the
jurisdiction, overall.

252. Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 215–16 (2011).
253. Id. at 222.
254. A Brief Historical Overview of Affordable Rental Housing, NAT’L LOW INCOME
HOUS. COAL. 1–6 (2015), https://bit.ly/2JPFWQe.
255. The affordability restrictions imposed by the federal Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Program terminate upon foreclosure or, in lieu of foreclosure, deed. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 42; I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(E)(i)(I). Federal regulation authorizes states to allow termination of
HOME Program affordability covenants upon foreclosure as well. 24 C.F.R.
§ 92.252(e)(1)(ii).
256. See COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, supra note 242, at 9; see also Permanent
Affordability: Practical Solutions, supra note 243, at 11–14.
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The availability of private, permanent financing may be particularly
affected for perpetually restricted affordable housing because the covenant
restricts the value of the property as collateral for the loan. To address this
problem, jurisdictions should consider increasing public loan amounts,
committing to capital improvement loans at some future date, making
guarantees or other forms of credit enhancement, or releasing the
affordability covenant under certain circumstances.257 The value limiting
approach of perpetual affordability covenants eliminates the possibility of
funding capital improvements by converting to market rate and increasing
income. Federal, state, and local anti-deficiency statutes that prevent
governmental agencies from creating financial obligations in excess of
actual or budgeted funds available eliminates the possibility of long-term
public funding commitments.258
Thus, in taking the value suppression approach to perpetual
affordability covenants, a jurisdiction must anticipate that the amount of
initial and on-going public subsidy needed per unit will be greater than in
jurisdictions aiming to maximize private investment in affordable housing.
Legislators might look to rent control statutes—which limit a landlord’s
ability to charge rents less than market rate and therefore, like affordability
covenants, suppress the market value of the real estate as a capital asset—
for ideas in ameliorating this problem. Rental properties subject to rent
control sometimes have similar challenges in obtaining loans for capital
improvements.259 Some rent control statutes contain conditions and
parameters for offering relief to landlords in need of private financing
without releasing the rent controls altogether. For example, in the District
of Columbia, the owner of a rent-controlled property can petition the
District Housing Administrator for a temporary rent increase of up to 20%
per unit, spread out over a certain number of years to pay for certain capital

257. See COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, supra note 242, at 13–14; see Permanent
Affordability: Practical Solutions, supra note 243, at 11.
258. For example, the federal government, at least six states, and many county, city,
and local governments have anti-deficiency statutes. See Limitations on Expending and
Obligating Amounts, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2019), ALA. CODE § 11-43C-67 (1975), ALA. CODE
§ 11-44C-67 (1975), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6519 (West 2005), MICH. CONST. srt. V §
18 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2018 amendments), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1371
(West 2007), MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-35-15 (West 1950), MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-11-15
(West 1950), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 17-211 (West 2019), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §
1416 (West 2019), R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-16-1 (West 2019), D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47355.01 (West 2019).
259. Housing units subject to affordability covenants remain limited in value whether
they are rental or homeownership units. See 24 CFR §92.254(a)(4) –(6); 24 CFR
§92.252(e)(1); see also District of Columbia Dep’t of Hous. & Comty. Dev. Template,
Affordable Hous. Covenant, https://bit.ly/2kL7Y4p. (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
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improvements or repairs.260 At the end of the specified time period, rents
return to pre-petition levels.261
As mentioned above, one reason a covenant can be released at
common law is the so-called changed condition doctrine.262 At common
law, this means that conditions surrounding the burdened or benefited
property have changed to such a degree that the purpose of the covenant
is defeated.263 A jurisdiction pursuing the value suppression approach to
perpetual affordability covenants should limit the availability of the
changed conditions doctrine while remaining cognizant of shifting state
and federal initiatives and priorities. For example, the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) requires all
construction, acquisition, and siting projects funded by public housing
authorities to undergo site and neighborhood review and environmental
justice review.264 These reviews evaluate several criteria to ensure that
HUD-funded affordable housing projects are not further concentrating
poverty or minority residents and that projects are not located in places
that are less environmentally healthy than unsubsidized housing.265 Not
only do demographics and area land uses change over time, but HUD
requirements do as well. For example, at times, HUD has favored locating
affordable housing in inner-city areas with the highest need for decent,
safe, affordable housing.266 More recently, there has been a push toward
smart growth and transit oriented design, intended to ensure that residents
of subsidized housing have access to public transportation, jobs, retail, and
community amenities.267 A jurisdiction adopting a value suppression
model of perpetual affordability covenant should anticipate the possibility
of a parcel falling out of sync with HUD location requirements and should
have a plan for how to manage the problem.
Another consideration for jurisdictions pursuing the value
suppression approach is the risk that a court will recast the perpetual
covenant as a taking without just compensation or an unconscionable loan.
For example, the Supreme Court has found that when a permit approval is
260. D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3502.10 (West 2011).
261. Id.
262. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 927.
263. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 488.
264. See Guidance on Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunity Requirements for
PHAs, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., FAIR HOUS.AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & PUB. &
INDIAN HOUS. 10–15 (2011), https://bit.ly/2HORHUQ.
265. See id.
266. See von Hoffman, supra note 187, at 7–10.
267. From 2011 to 2015, HUD sponsored the Sustainable Communities Initiative,
which included the Community Challenge Grant Program, which is a grant program
designed to promote mixed-use, mixed-income (including affordable housing), transit
oriented, higher density community planning, and development. See Community Challenge
Grants, HUD, https://bit.ly/2HOkpFj (last visited Aug. 28, 2019)
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conditioned on an exaction,268 there must be rough proportionality
between the impact of the development and the exaction demanded.269
When affordability covenants are imposed as part of a zoning or permitting
requirement, for example, as a part of a Planned Unit Development
approval, a jurisdiction should be cognizant of Dolan jurisprudence and
the rough proportionality test.270 At least with regard to Inclusionary
Zoning statutes, case law suggests courts’ disinclination to find long-term
affordability requirements takings. In 2910 Georgia Avenue v. District of
Columbia, where a developer challenged the District of Columbia’s
Inclusionary Zoning statute as a regulatory taking, the federal district court
found that the statute did not constitute a regulatory taking because only
two of 22 units in the development were affected and the economic impact
of the regulation did not deprive the owner of a reasonable rate of return.271
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has held that long-term, deedrestricted affordable housing units required pursuant to a city’s
Inclusionary Zoning statute are not exactions to be evaluated under the
Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions test, but rather are merely land
use restrictions within a jurisdiction’s general police power and are
entitled to deferential treatment.272
c.

Drafting Legislation for the Value Suppression
Approach

In drafting legislation to enable the creation of a portfolio of value
suppressed real estate permanently dedicated to use as affordable housing
via perpetual affordability covenants, a jurisdiction will want to first
broadly define affordability covenants so that all covenants required by
state and local programs will be covered by the statute. Second, drafters
should include a validation statute modeled on the UCEA and expressly
intended to validate affordability covenants despite inconsistencies with
common law requirements.273 Third, jurisdictions should ensure due
process but limit the means of terminating the covenant to the greatest
extent possible by granting expansive standing to enforce as well as third

268. Land-use Exaction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A requirement
imposed by a local government that a developer dedicate real property for a public facility
or pay a fee to mitigate the impacts of the project, as a condition of receiving a discretionary
land-use approval.”).
269. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
270. For discussion of Dolan, see Section III.B.
271. 2910 Ga. Ave., L.L.C. v. District of Columbia et al., 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 299
(D.D.C. 2017).
272. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n., 351 P.3d at 991.
273. UNIF. CONSERVATION ACT § 3(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) (amended 2007);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 123(3) (1991).
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party beneficiary status.274 Finally, jurisdictions pursuing the value
suppression approach should be careful to satisfy substantive and
procedural due process requirements of public land use law by first clearly
articulating the public need and interest served by the legislation,275
making decisions related to affordability covenants in accordance with a
comprehensive plan,276 and making available to landlords methods of
case-by-case assistance short of release.
2.

Value Capture Approach

An alternative paradigm for understanding perpetual affordability
covenants is to view the covenants themselves as the assets to be managed
by the municipality. In this view, the jurisdiction does not aim to suppress
the value of real estate, rather, it attempts to capture the difference between
the real estate as use-restricted and at market rate and exclusively control
when to release a covenant and for what consideration. To illustrate the
difference between the value suppression and the value capture models,
assume that the Chinatown low-income senior housing building from the
hypothetical in the introduction was subject to a perpetual affordability
covenant. The appraised value of the property, assuming its use is
perpetually limited to providing low-income housing to seniors, based on
the limited income-stream from rents, is valued at $65 million. The
appraised value of the property without restricting its use to affordable
residential housing is $265 million. In the value suppression approach, the
municipality would essentially ignore the unrestricted value of the
property and attempt to limit means of terminating the covenant as much
as possible. Under the value capture approach, the jurisdiction would
recognize $200 million as the value of the covenant and would put in place
parameters and procedures for deciding when, whether, and for what
consideration the jurisdiction would agree to terminate the covenant.
a.

Benefits of Value Capture Approach

In some senses, the benefits and shortcomings of the value capture
approach to perpetual affordability covenants are the inverse of the value
suppression approach. For example, in the value capture model, it is
possible for everyone—the jurisdiction, the jurisdiction’s consumers of
affordable housing, the landlord and the prospective buyer—to benefit
financially from the unsuppressed value of real estate restricted by a

274. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 62101(f)(7) (West 2016) (granting enforcement
authority to various public bodies; qualified past, present, and future tenants; and the
tenants association).
275. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.275 (West 2010).
276. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 2009).
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perpetual affordability covenant. The jurisdiction and affordable housing
consumers of rental housing benefit in at least two ways. First, if a
covenant’s term is viewed not as permanent, but rather as indeterminate,
conditional, or subject to release in the jurisdiction’s reasonable discretion,
there is less cause for a chill on private investment in affordable housing.
The more leverage each subsidy dollar is able to secure in private
financing, the more affordable housing the jurisdiction will be able to
produce. Second, if a jurisdiction agrees to release a covenant in exchange
for the market rate value of the covenant,277 or some value rough
equivalent of value, the jurisdiction may be able to replace the same
number or even more units elsewhere by reinvesting the proceeds from the
released covenant into new affordable housing transactions subject to new
covenants. In addition to more liquid assets, by not having permanently
fixed affordable housing stock tied to specific pieces of real estate, a
jurisdiction may be better able to change its affordable housing priorities
in accordance with market factors, the comprehensive plan, or HUD
requirements. For example, if a jurisdiction notes an increase in demand
for housing near transit hubs, the jurisdiction may decide to release a
covenant on valuable, downtown property in exchange for three times the
number of affordable units being restricted in buildings near transit
stations in less expensive neighborhoods.
b.

Drawbacks of the Value Capture Approach

As is apparent in the hypothetical above, the obvious downsides of
the value capture model are that it does not necessarily preserve specific
pieces of real estate for affordable housing use. When an affordability
covenant is terminated or released, there is a reasonable chance that the
residents who live in the building will have to move, disrupting personal
and community stability.278 Additionally, as with zoning amendments,
277. The Massachusetts and Oregon affordability covenant enabling acts require, as
a precondition of release, that the burdened landowner repurchase the covenant for a price
equal to the difference between the restricted and unrestricted value of the burdened
property. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 456.280(6) (West 2010).
278. When affordability covenants are terminated because a property opts out of the
project-based Section 8 program or prepays its HUD-subsidized Section 236 or 221(d)(3)
mortgage, residents of the property are issued enhanced tenant protection vouchers. These
vouchers are intended to enable the tenant to afford market rate rents in the building,
depending on whether the property will continue to be a rental property and on the cost of
the market-rate rents. See Guidance on Eligibility for Tenant Protection Vouchers
Following Certain Housing Conversion Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (2012),
https://bit.ly/2JQEq0d. When restrictions under the LIHTC and HOME programs
terminate, state and local law will determine whether and how quickly rents can be raised
to market rate and what, if any, assistance is available to low income property residents.
Additionally, the tax code provides tenants in LIHTC properties a three-year buffer after
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when the door is opened for a locality to release covenants or make
individualized zoning amendments, there is great potential for corruption
and bias. Legislation enabling the use of perpetual affordability covenants
for the value capture approach affords the government body the discretion
and authority to make “deals” regarding the release of covenants while
simultaneously providing sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure
transparency and decisions that are truly in the public interest. For
example, Massachusetts’s affordability covenant enabling act allows only
the governmental body or nonprofit entity who holds the benefit of the
covenant to release the covenant. Prior to releasing a covenant, however,
(1) the department of housing must hold a public hearing, (2) the
department of housing must find that releasing the covenant is in
accordance with the comprehensive plan, and (3) if the covenant was
initially imposed in exchange for a public loan or grant, the burdened land
owner must pay the difference between the value of the land as restricted
and the value of the land unrestricted to purchase the property interest
represented by the covenant.279
c.

Drafting Legislation for the Value Capture Approach

As with the value suppression model, the most important tasks for
affordability covenant enabling legislation in furtherance of the value
capture model is to define affordability covenants broadly enough to
capture all varieties of affordability covenants in use in the jurisdiction and
validate these covenants despite their shortcomings at common law.
Enabling legislation for affordability covenants pursuing the value capture
model must also seek to control the circumstances of covenant termination
as much as possible, ideally so that termination decisions are in the sole
discretion of a governmental body. As with the value suppression model
this means directly invalidating prescription, laches, estoppel, and
acquiescence as means of terminating a covenant. The legislature should
also limit beneficiary status and standing to enforce the covenant to a
single governmental body, to the greatest extent possible. A jurisdiction’s
decision whether to release a perpetual affordability covenant will likely
be controversial and enabling legislation may secure the jurisdictions
authority and discretion in making this decision. However, jurisdictions
must be mindful of federal law in attempting to secure their own
discretion. For example, under the federal tax code, not only the
municipality but also all income qualifying former, current, and future
the termination of the covenant, during which time rents for existing tenants cannot be
raised by an amount more than would be allowed under the LIHTC program. Further,
existing tenants in LIHTC properties cannot be evicted except for cause. 26 U.S.C.A.
§42(h)(6)(E)(ii) (West 2018).
279. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West 2009).
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occupants280 of a LIHTC project have standing to enforce the affordability
covenant in state court.281 In Nordbye, the Oregon Court of Appeals held
that a former tenant of a LIHTC property had standing to enforce an
affordability covenant even though the owner of the property and the
jurisdiction had executed and recorded a release of the covenant.282
IV. CONCLUSION
For the billions of dollars of public affordable housing investment
presumably secured in the United States today by affordability covenants,
there has been shockingly little analysis of the validity of this tool. This
Article demonstrates how perpetual affordability covenants, like
conservation servitudes, environmental covenants, contingent zoning, and
development agreements, are a “hybrid” public/private land use servitude
and zoning. Most jurisdictions employing real covenants and equitable
servitudes to secure their affordable housing investments blindly rely on
common law principles for the enforceability of these instruments.
However, these instruments have several glaring flaws that should prevent
their enforceability at common law. Specifically, the benefit of the
covenant is held in-gross, there is often no horizontal privity, and they are
almost always unreasonable restraints on alienation. Despite these
common law shortcomings, courts to date often enforce the covenants on
tenuous public policy grounds. This Article strongly recommends that
state legislators should take heed of those six states that have
acknowledged the need for affordability covenant enabling legislation to
secure the enforceability of these instruments and provides suggestions
about what such enabling legislation should contain. This Article also
serves to build on the small body of scholarly literature defining
public/private land use devices and mapping the contours of legitimate
state action therein.

280. Granting standing to income eligible former or future occupants of a LIHTC
project is tantamount to granting any private citizen the right to enforce the affordability
covenant because of the relatively high income limits allowed in LIHTC projects.
281. 26 U.S.C.A. § 42(h)(6)(B)(ii) (West 2018).
282. Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington, 246 Or. App. 209, 222 (2011).

